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On no subject are our ideas more warped and pitiable than on death.
Let children walk with nature, let them see the beautiful blendings and
communions of death and life, their joyous inseparable unity, as taught
in woods and meadows, plains and mountains and streams of our
blessed star, and they will learn that death is stingless indeed, and as
beautiful as life, and that the grave has no victory, for it never fights.
- John Muir
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of death holds a firm grip on the Western consciousness, as well
as on the physical body. Commentary about death has been handed down2
through the ages from sources such as the scriptures, playwrights, and poets.
Woven around the subject of death is an entire narrative or conversation, what
the French social historian, Philippe Aries, describes as "the hour of our death."3
The impact of this narrative is considerable, affecting death rituals and
decisions about life-sustaining treatment alike. One significant impact is on the
law concerning death-related decisions. As this paper argues, the prevailing
narrative of "the hour of our death" has significantly affected the efficacy of
requests to withdraw or withhold treatment for persons in persistent
vegetative states. In particular, legal tools such as the health care proxy and
living wills are underutilized precisely because of the dominant narrative of
avoiding death.
The narrative of death has changed greatly over time. In an earlier era, a
societal narrative of the tamed or good death existed 4 - one considered death
'"both familiar and near, evoking no great fear or awe."5 This view of death as
a transition contemplates the possibility of a gentle passing.
The dominant modem perspective minimizes the notion of the "good death."
Today, Americans do not talk about death in the personal realm. It is not a part
of one's life, but rather an event removed from home and culture, occurring
primarily in the hospital, hospice or nursing home. The modem death is

2"In a Dark Time, the Eye Begins to See." JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF THE MYTH
39(1988).
"Oh lord, give each of us his own death, The dying, that issues forth
out of life In which he had love, meaning and despair."

Id.

"To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under

heaven: A time to be born, and a time to die." Ecclesiastes 3:1.
3

See PHILIPPE ARIES, WESTERN ATITUDES TOWARDS DEATH: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES
TO THE PRESENT (1974).
4

This view is typified by the Indian tribal elder's statement in the film, Little Big

Man, "Today is a good day to die." LITTLE BIG MAN.
5

ARIEs, supra note 3, at 13.
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packaged and clean, with hospitals and burial homes overseeing the
6
operation.
Today, death is something that "one must avoid - no longer for the sake of
the dying person, but for society's sake, for the sake of those close to the dying
person - the disturbance and the overly strong and unbearable emotion caused
by the ugliness of dying."7 The fear of death 8 manifests itself in many ways,
from a morbid curiosity about others' mortal injuries to a hesitancy in adopting
advance directives such as the health care proxy. Any contemplation of a
chosen death or of voluntarily deciding its circumstances is anathema to both
cultural and legal norms. Indeed, the extension of life in any form is
paramount.9
The current dominant narrative is largely attributable to advances in medical
technology and the isolation of death-related medicine in hospitals. Medicine
has contributed to longer and healthier lives, with great leaps forward in
transplantation, surgery, genetic therapy, and many other areas involving
human longevity. The average life expectance in 1900 was forty-nine years; in
1950, 68.2 years; and today, seventy-six years.10 The exponential growth in
longevity, when coupled with discoveries such as antibiotics, has created
expectations that modem medicine will one day be able to eventually cure
disease - whether itbe AIDS, cancer or Alzheimer's -and find the key to aging.11
Yet, these scientific advances paradoxically have fueled unrealistic
12
expectations about medicine's ability to fight and eventually conquer disease.

6

One physician who has regularly dealt with death describes this phenomenon as
follows:
We have created the method of modem dying. Modem dying takes
place in the modem hospital, where it can be hidden, cleansed of its
organic blight, and finally packaged for modem burial. We can now
deny the power not only of death but of nature itself. We hide our
faces from its face ....
SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE's FINAL CHAPTER, at xv (1994).
7

ARiEs, supra note 3, at 87.
8Within the American culture, death is life's leading antagonist.
9
See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Nancy Beth Cruzan lay in a coma with
no sense of her surrounding, yet she was deemed to be "living."
10
In the year 2010, the average person is expected to live until the age of 77.9 years.
Seegenerally LawrenceA. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population:A Challengeto

the Law, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (1991).

11Cryogenics, involving the science of freezing life to be thawed at a later time, has
gained increasing legitimacy. Especially after the freezing of embryos which were
subsequently implanted successfully. JOHN BOWKER, THE MEANINGSOF DEATH 3 (1991).
12
A corollary to America's obsession with avoiding death is its preoccupation with
preserving youthfulness. Americans undergo cosmetic surgery, purchase youth
enhancing products, and participate in exercise and diet programs, all to maintain
youthful vitality.
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The advances have helped foster a perplexing question 13 - is death with dignity
more important than lingering life? 14 Medicine's ability to maintain human life
in a persistent vegetative state15 with no hope of probable recovery, for
example, (or its ability to extend life generally in its final stages of terminal
illness), presents one of the more vexing aspects of the gains in modem
medicine. Given the financial and emotional expense of maintaining life in a
near-death 16 state, 17 can and should life be maintained at all cost?18

America's obsession with immortality is evident from its passion of death and
death-related rituals. Even burial rituals are laced with defiance - proclamations of
enduring spirit, if not flesh. For example, Americans have been buried in their sports
cars or cremated and loaded into a bullet with instructions to be shot at an animal during
hunting season. 15 HARPER'S INDEX (1993).
13

Another way of asking this question: Is there a point in time when life should
succumb to death? Norman L. Cantor, Quinlan,Privacy and the Handlingof Incompetent
Dying Patients,30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243,268 (1977).

14 What of the cost of dying in hospitals, far away from loved ones and a familiar
nurturing environment? What of the price of continuing treatment when there is no
reasonable hope of a return to a gainful sapient life?
15

The phrase "persistent vegetative state" is attributed to Dr. Fred Plum, Professor
and Chairman of the Department of Neurology at Cornell University. Dr. Plum
explained:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in
terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains
heart beat and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity.
It maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level condition
responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness
or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987).
A second commentator describes the persistent vegetative state as involving:
[A] total loss of cerebral cortical functioning; they are permanently and
irreversibly devoid of any awareness, thought, or feelings. Thus, the
permanently vegetative patient's 'personality, memory, purposive
action, social interaction ....
,joy, satisfaction and pleasure [are forever gone]'. Moreover, such patients do not and will never experience
pain or suffering .... A diagnosis of the permanent vegetative state
usually can be made with a reasonably high degree of reliability within
weeks or months after the original injury by a physician skilled in
neurological diagnosis.
RobynS.Shapiro, The CaseofL W.:AnArgumentforaPernanentVegetative State Treatment
Statute, 51 OHio ST.L.J. 439, 441-42 (1990).
16

The costs of extending life can be considerable. "[Pirolonged dying can involve
considerable pain and suffering, not just a philosophical preference for controlling the
time of death; this physical and psychological impact on the moribund patient must be
considered." Cantor, supra note 13, at 248.
17
1n a persistent vegetative state there exists a "contrast between severe mental loss
and the subject's preserved autonomic or vegetative functioning." FRED PLUM & JEROME
POSNER, THE DIAGNOsIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 6 (3d ed. 1980) (explaining that the

patient's brain stem maintains its functioning but the patient is not cognizant of any
such functioning and has no higher thought processes). See also Elizabeth D. McLean,
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The legal response to this conflict in values has not kept pace with medical
advances. The legislatures in all fifty states 19 have acted, as well as the Supreme
Court.20 Legislatures have adopted some form of "advance directives," which
permit a patient in advance of becoming incompetent to maintain autonomous
control over his or her health care decisions. 21 One such directive is the durable
power of attorney on health care decisions, also known as the health care proxy.
With the proxy, a surrogate decision-maker is appointed to make health care
decisions in the event the subject becomes incapacitated. 22
Yet, the health care proxy and other advance directives are themselves dying
from disuse. Few people know about the health care proxy mechanism, and of
those, few sign it.23 The legal apparatus appears to be failing.

Comment, Living Will Statutes in Light ofCruzanv. Director,Missouri DepartmentofHealth:
Ensuring That a Patient's Wishes Will Prevail,40 EMORY L.J. 1305,1306 n.6.
18This issue has provoked a plethora of opinions. For example, S. Norman-Culp,
Trying to Die with Dignity Has its Price,THE OR. REG., May 6,1993, at GI; C. Crosby,
InternistsGrapplewithHow They Should Respond to RequestsforAid in Dying,THE INTERNIST
Mar. 1992, at 10.
19 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19A-575 (1993) (stating that anyperson eighteen years
or older may execute a document which shall contain directions as to specificlife support
systems which such person chooses to have administered); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 2502 (1993) (providing that an individual, legally adult, who is competent and of
sound mind, has the right to refuse medical treatment or surgical treatment if such
refusal is not contrary to existing public health laws); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-202
(Michie 1993) (providing that an individual of sound mind and eighteen or more years
of ages may execute at any time a declaration governing the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment).
20
The Court gave its official imprimatur to the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment, including nutrition and hydration in Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 110
S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
21
A patient who utilizes an advance directive retains the choice whether to continue
life-sustaining treatment.
22

While Aries' narrative of death impacts on our collective experience, it also rumbles
loosely in the interstices of western legal thought. To examine advance directives
without also examining the social impact of the hour of our death narrative would be
naive at best. This narrative cuts across disciplinary lines and impacts legal principles.
Yet, the efficacy of the health care proxy is subject to great doubt. Studies, both
formal and informal, show that the support for such measures is far greater than their
actual use. This may be due to the legal devices and tools created by the western legal
tradition, including the health care proxy, being premised on a rationality of behavior
described as legal competency. Specifically, the competent decision-maker is believed
to be autonomous. Autonomy means that people will make conscious, knowing, and
voluntary choices in their lives. Since volitional conduct is autonomous, actors will be
held responsible for their choices. This vision of social responsibility and autonomy,
however, seems to disintegrate when the subject matter is death. More specifically, the
law has trouble overcoming mythology, culture, and religion in creating workable rules
regarding life-prolonging decision-making for patients who lack the capacity to make
their own decisions.
23
See, e.g., Nova Southeastern University Law Center Survey, 1994, where 92% of
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This paper examines whether and how the legal apparatus, specifically the
health care proxy can be made more effective. The paper argues that while the
objectives of law and medicine may conflict, 24 the differences between the two
mischaracterize the terrain of the debate. It is not so much that law and
medicine approach death differently, but rather that neither discipline features
a supportive societal death conversation or narrative.
Only when there exists a narrative of the good death will the legal apparatus
be more successful with death-related issues. The adoption of a new narrative
will permit the modification of the current historical bright-line test used to
describe life and death, will foster the reimagining of death in the personal
25
realm, and will promote the efficacy of the legal framework.
This article is divided into three sections. After this introduction, section II
features a brief history of the narrative of death, explores the role of heroism in
the death narrative, describes the "miracles" of modem medicine, and analyzes
some of the resulting adverse transformations wrought by the advances. The
transformations include the unrealistic expectations of longevity and obsession
with youthfulness, the removal of death from the personal realm, and the
change in the nature of death. Section III examines the legal apparatus erected
to meet the issues created by the medical advances, including the redefinition
of death, and Constitutional, common law, and legislative enactments. The
legislative response includes advance directives such as living wills and health
care proxies. Section IV examines the reasons for the disuse of the health care
proxy. Section V offers a proposal to increase the effectiveness of the health care
proxy and the legal apparatus in general. Specifically, this section proposes a
modification of the prevailing narrative of death to promote greater acceptance
of death as a part of the life cycle.

those surveyed would designate someone to make such decisions for them, yet only

26% had actually designated a surrogate.
24
The legal community theories about whether such actions are within the confines
of the law; the medical community ponders the ethics of terminating a life; and the
religious community debates the implications to a person's afterlife." Michele Yuen,
Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standardsfor Surrogate Decision-Making, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 581, 582 (1992).
25
The article highlights the inapplicability of the assumption in modem western legal
thought thata competentperson's decision-making process is autonomous. Particularly
in the area of death, such an assumption is far removed from reality. It is not merely the
lack of the linguistic turn that incapacitates legal analysis in this area; the rarified
language is simply indicative of minimized social, economic, and political relations,
which have removed central structures and formations to the historical sidelines. BRYAN
D. PALMER, DESCENT INTO DiSCOURSE 5 (1990) ("for all the exhortations and prefatory
gestures toward language and its complexities, those social historians who champion a
history informed bydiscourse (orcritical/literary linguistic) theory seldom betray much
of an interest in the very key that they contend can open the hermeneutic door to the
past"). Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Narrativeof Death
26
"The prospect of death... wonderfully concentrates the mind.'

A narrative is a representative context, a prism through which the world is
described. On one level, it is a story or dialogue about a specific event, person,
situation or time. On another level, it reveals a vision of world, replete with
values, assumptions, and beliefs about how the world works.
The usefulness of narrative is predicated on the belief that "it]he way people
talk about their lives is of significance, that the language they use and the
connections they make reveal the world that they see and in which they act."27
Thus, an understanding of the rhetoric contained in a narrative sheds light not
just on the meaning of words, but on relationships and power configurations
as well. The narrative is a connector, 28 a potent means of bridging different
concepts, understandings and values, or even the antinomies of life. It is a
method of piecing together experience into a grander schematic. 29 One apt
illustration of narrative is myth, a form that synthesizes truth and belief. In
myths handed down from generation to generation, from ancient Greece or
Egypt to the frontier Old West, to any hero's grand adventure, there is a "point
of wisdom beyond the conflicts of illusion and truth by which lives can be put
back together again." 30
The context of the narrative, such as the setting, also impacts greatly on the
message communicated. The context affects the relationship between the
rhetoric and its interpretation, creating an aesthetic. 3 1 The aesthetic is defined
26

ERNEsT BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH ix (1973).

27

CAROLE GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 2 (1982).

28

The narrative takes other forms as well, including oral history or even song. Its
flexibility extends so that the narrative may be ceremonial or simply habitual. It need
notbe passed down from one generation to the next, and can be written as well as verbal.
It also can be embodied in nonverbal conduct.
29

1t is, in a sense, "an interior roadmap of experience. .. "CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at

xvi (Bill Moyers, Introduction).
30
1d. at xviii. "We're so engaged in doing things to achieve purposes of outer value
that we forget that the inner value, the rapture that is associated with being alive, is what

it's all about." Id. at 6.
31

If the meaning of a narrative depends more on its tenor, feeling or visualization
than its text, it maybe viewed as a kind of aesthetic. This can beviewed as an application

of "the medium is the message" theory. Yet, it is much more. An aesthetic is created by
more than the medium, but by all factors influencing interpretation. It is more a
reflection that "plain meaning" is not to be found in the rhetoric of a text but in a
combination of rhetoric, context, and intersubjective factors that influence the premises
of interpretation. See generally Stanley E.Fish, Normal Circumstances,Literal Language,
DirectSpeech Acts, the Ordinary,the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying and
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by the narrative's intersubjective parts. For example, rhetoric is not
communicated neutrally, but by a person with experience, interests, and biases,
who possesses a particular style of delivery. The same can be said of the
receiver, who may have a totally different set of experiences, interests, and
biases, along with a different style of receiving.32 Timing, location, and other
variables affect the narrative's interpretation. Thus, the meaning of a narrative
depends on its intersubjective parts.
2. The Narrative of Death
The narrative of death is that conversation which structures the individual
and societal vision of death. This narrative is based on interpretive constructs
that essentially act as a foundation for the perspectives held about life - what
it is, how it endures, and how it ends.
The narrative of death, far from severing the thread of life, often serves to
sharpen life's narrative. The prospect of death can inform, motivate, and define
the way in which life is lived. 3 The use of the death narrative to "concentrate
the mind" about life, however, is often stifled by fear.
3. A Dominant Characteristic of the Narrative - Fear of Death
The current dominant narrative of death is characterized by fear. 34 This fear
concerns the prospect of our own death and manifests itself as a psychological
inability to visualize the state of death.3 5

Other Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 625 (Summer 1978), reprinted in STANLEY E. FISH,
Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 269 (1980).
32

Even how this paper is "received" depends on the interaction with the reader and
the experiences the reader brings to it. The text is therefore not autonomous, but exists
only in the eyes of the reader. It is not a question of whether it will be interpreted, but
how. See Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous
Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1065 (1993).
33

"Death is not the ultimate tragedy of life. The ultimate tragedy is to die without
discovering the possibilities of full growth. The approach of death need notbe the denial
of that growth." - Norman Cousins
34
"We all labor against our own cure, for death is the cure of all diseases." SIR THOMAS
BROWNE, RELIGIO MEDICI PART II, Section ix, G. (1968) (1st ed. London 1642). "Next not
his ghost, oh, let him pass! He hates him. For that would upon the rack of this tough

world. Stretch him out longer." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIFTH PART OF KING LEAR,

act 3.
35

As on physician describes it:

None of us seems psychologically able to cope with the thought of our
own state of death, with the idea of a permanent unconsciousness in
which there is neither void nor vacuum - in which there is simply nothing. It seems so different from the nothing that preceded life. As with
every other looming terror and looming temptation, we seek ways to
deny the power of death and the icy hold in which it grips human
thought.
NULAND, supra note 6, at xv.
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The pervasiveness of this fear and the avoidance it causes can not be
understated. The fear of death embraces human existence 36 and "haunts the
human animal like nothing else; it is a mainspring of human activity - activity
designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in
some way that it is the final destiny for man."37 Death, while recognized as
inevitable, is only intellectually, rather than emotionally cognizable. 38 The full
impact of it is suppressed. 39 It is translated, transformed, and hidden from
view.
While death is secreted away from the American conscious, the fear of death
runs unchecked. The calming view of death as a final promotion - embraced

by primitive societies 40 - has become vestigial. With death no longer seen as an
advancement or a continuation of a journey, most people in the Western world
4
are unwilling to contemplate their own mortality. 1

36Thus, it is not a great leap to observe that death is central to human life; "that of all
things that move man, one of the principle ones is his terror of death." BECKER, supra
note 26, at 11. Even though death might be hidden and intentionally obscured, it is
everpresent. As William James wrote:
Let sanguine healthy-mindedness do its best with its strange power of
living in the moment and ignoring and forgetting, still the evil background is really there to be thought of, and the skull will grin at the
banquet.
Id. at 16 (quoting William James).
37

1d. at ix.
As one commentator noted:
Therefore in normal times we move about actually without ever
believing in our own death, as if we fully believed in our own corporeal
immortality. We are intent on mastering death.., a man will say, of
course, that he knows he will die someday, but he does not really care.
He's having a good time with living, and he does not think about death
and does not care to bother about it - but this is a purely intellectual,
verbal admission. The affect of death is repressed.
Id. at 17 (quoting Zilborg); see also KURT R. EISSLER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE DYING
PATIENT 277 (1955).
38

39
Death often serves as the harbinger of life. As author William James observed,
"death is 'the worm at the core' of man's pretentions for happiness." BECKER, supra note
26, at 15.
40

Primitives often celebrate death - as Hocart and others have shown because they believe that death is the ultimate promotion, the final ritual
elevation to a higher form of life, to the enjoyment of eternity in some
form. Most modem Westerners have trouble believing this any more,
which is what makes the fear of death so prominent a part of our
psychological make-up.
Id. at ix.
41
The fear of death is a commonality of human existence, not simply an isolated or
anecdotal occurrence. See generally GEORGE BURNELL, M.D., FINAL CHOICES: To LIvE OR

TO DIE IN AN AGE OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 1 (1993). The fear transcends and unites the

many disciplines that deal with death issues. See BECKER, supra note 26, at ix. "The col-
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4. A Brief Historical Review of the Death Narrative
Attitudes towards death have changed dramatically during the past several
centuries in Western civilization. In earlier times, the narrative included the
possibility of the "good death." Rather than something to be feared, death was
considered salvation.42 Indeed, death was even believed to be spiritually
healthy.43 The good death had its genesis in religion, but could be observed in
medicine and law as well.
One belief common to many of the world's major religions is that death is
not permanent, but rather a temporary state. Human existence is a pathway
involving many more stages than solitary life and death. Buddhists, for
example, consider death to be a transitory stage, one that continues until an
awareness of the inevitability of transience occurs.44 Hindus believe that death
is not a single, final event, but one that will reoccur numerous times.
Consequently, it should not be treated with significance.45 Islamics also view
death as transitory, a process leading to a final judgment.46
The Judeo-Christian perspective of death is somewhat different than that of
the far eastern religions. This perspective does not involve the dead being
reborn on earth in different forms as a matter of course. While there is an
afterworld, death has more finality. In Christianity, death "does not evacuate
... the pain... by some compensatory promise of resurrection."4 7 Additionally,
the Jewish understanding of death differs somewhat from that of Christians.
Judaism views death as an affirmation of faith.
A medical history also reveals transformation of attitudes towards death. In
prior eras, medicine served to comfort the dying as much as to delay death. For
example, in outbreaks of plague or significant disease such as tuberculosis,

lective attitude toward death has led to a universal fear of the dying experience in our
society .... " BuRNELL, supra note 41, at 5.
42

Faith in the possibility of such a scenario [of the good death] has ever
been a tradition of Western societies, which in centuries past valued
a good death as the salvation of the soul and an uplifting experience
for friends and family and celebrated it in the literature and pictorial

representations of ars moriendi, the art of dying.
NULAND, supranote 6, at xvi.
43
"Originally, ars moriendi was a religious and spiritual endeavor, described by the
fifteenth-centurypainter William Caxton as'thecraft for to deye for thehelthe of mannes

sowle.'" Id.

44There must be "recognition, that nothing is immune from that transience ....
BOWKER, supranote 11, at 204.
45

"[Death] will happen many times; and one should not be involved in it in any
anxious way." Id. at 142.
46

"So Death is not itself a punishment: it simply brings to an end a particular stage

in a much longer process culminating in the day of resurrection and the final judgment."
Id. at 105. Moreover, it can occur only as a result of God's will. Id. at 104.
47

1d. at 86.
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doctors often were ineffective in providing anything other than moral support
to their patients. Until the 20th Century doctors had very few administrable
remedies for illness. 48 In devising all kinds of diagnoses and remedies, from
"overexcited," requiring bloodletting, to "exhaustion," requiring a prescription
of whiskey,49 the patient that survived did so as much despite the doctor as
because of him or her.
The age of antibiotics brought significant changes in how medicine was
practiced. 50 By achieving the apparent defeat of various diseases with
antibiotics, death became an enemy that could be delayed or potentially
defeated. Yet, belief in death with dignity did not leave the medical profession
completely. "Although physicians have learned to hate death as an enemy to
be defeated, many physicians, especially those who see death daily or weekly,
recognize death as ending pain or bringing peace at the end of a long and
productive life."51
A legal history of the narrative of death also exists. The common law had
adopted a bright-line test for defining death, generally described as the
cessation of cardiovascular functioning.52 The law endorsed more than a
predictable and uniform measure, it emphasized the sanctity of life in any form.
This was seen in the criminalization of any deprivation of life. Intentionally
shortening a mortally wounded victim's life by any length of time, for example,
would constitute murder under the common law.53

48

"19th-Century medicine knew only a handful of useful treatments for specific
diseases - cinchona bark for malaria, mercury (generally but not invariably in nonlethal
dosages) for syphilis, digitalis for heart failure." Jerry Adler, The Age Before Miracles,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1994, at 52.
49"With no understanding of infection, physicians often regarded disease as the sign

of an organism whose inner workings had mysteriously gone out of balance ....An
1866 medical text recommends treatingpneumonia with, among other things, castor oil,
chloroform, ammonia, cold water brandy and the popular, although useless, opium."

Id.
50

With disease-specific antibiotics, doctors began to treat the disease, rather than the

patient. Id. The doctor no longer needed to have a continuing relationship with the
patient or the patient's family. Since the focal point was the disease, not the person, a
continuing relationship was not essential. DAVIDJ. ROTI-IMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE
129 (1991).
51

BURNELL, supra note 41, at 65.

52

In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 591 (Fla. 1992).

3

5 Murder at common law was the unlawful killing of another human being with
malice aforethought. Intentionally shortening another person's life could constitute
murder.
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5. The Narrative of Death and Heroism
"One such vital truth that has long been known is the idea of heroism
calling, our main task on
.... [W]e like to be reminded
"54 that our central
this planet, is the hemic.
55
One concept that underlies the past and present death narrative is heroism.
56
Heroism provides meaning in life and is central to the way society is
constructed. 57 It appears to offer an explanation of the "good death."
Ernest Becker suggests that heroism is based in part on Freud's concept of
narcissism, in which each human is hopelessly absorbed in his or her self. As
Becker puts it, "[i]f we care about anyone it is usually ourselves first of all. As
Aristotle somewhere put it: luck is when the guy next to you gets hit with the
arrow."58 Narcissism embodies the belief that the only necessary person to
survive is oneself. "This narcissism is what keeps men marching into
point-blank fire in wars: at heart one doesn't feel that he will die, he only feels
sorry for the man next to him."59 The selfishness of narcissism is neither
Machiavellian nor deceptive. Instead, it is enmeshed with a person's feelings
of self-worth. 60 This self-worth, in turn, is dependent on the desire for meaning
in life. 61

54

BECKER, supra note 26, at 1.

55

1d. at 1 - 8.

56 Becker reconciles the claim of heroism as the desire to create meaning or specialness

on the earth. Id.
57

The urge to be a hero is crucial to social organization within society. Collective

heroism is thus a societal organizing principle:
[Tihe problem of heroics is the central one of human life, that goes
deeper in human nature than anything else because it is based on
organismic narcissism and on the child's need for self esteem as the
condition for his life. Society itself is a codified hero system, which
means that society everywhere is a living myth of the significance
of human life, a defiant creation of meaning.
Id. at 7.
58
BEcyki, supra note 26, at 2.
59
60

1d.
1d. at 3.

61

The narcissistic desire to be a hero, to stand out, can be understood as the desire
for meaning. Becker says:
Whatever is achieved must be achieved from within the subjective
energies of creatures, without deadening, with the full exercise of
passion, of vision, of pain, of fear, and of sorrow. How so we know
- with Rilke - that our part of the meaning of the universe might not
be a rhythm in sorrow? Manipulative, utopian science, by deadening

human sensitivity, would also deprive men of the heroic in their urge
to victory.
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Heroism in modem Western society is intricately linked to advances in
science and medicine. Society is hopeful that science, money, and goods make
humans count for more than any other animal. 62 Medical advances in
particular indicate human-kind's heroic advances against the inexorable march
of nature.
Yet medicine has contributed to a waning belief in the desire for traditional
heroism. 63 The moral and pragmatic decay of society, particularly the erosion
of civility, may in part be attributable to a diffusion of the heroic urge. Heroism
had provided the glue that cemented the social fabric; it had offered unity of
direction and purpose. Now, a new heroism has developed. Rather than
welcoming death in heroic fashion, the new heroism is almost an anti-heroism,
embodying a belief that death can be beaten or delayed.
6. The New Heroism - Defeating Death
The demise of the belief in the good death has prompted the adoption of a
new form of heroism, one that involves beating death, not accepting it with
dignity. As a result, medicine has become side-tracked. 64 As society strives for
a health care system that works, it is distracted by the need to prolong and delay
dying, which is in part fueled by our obsession with health and our fear of
death. This obsession has two parts:
[o]ne moral, the other medical. The moral part is the belief that we have
an unlimited obligation to combat death and lethal disease. That is
essentially the mission of biomedical research, which, with enormous
public support, conducts unrelenting wars against death. The medical
part is the potent assumption that death is essentially an accident,
correctable with enough money, will and scientific ingenuity: if
smallpox could be conquered, then so can heart disease. If typhoid
fever65was eliminated, someday Alzheimer's disease will be beaten as
well.

Id. at 284.
62

BECKER, supra note 26, at 1-8.

63

Becker suggests that the socially constituted society has lost the feeling that

heroism really counts. This is particularly true for today's youth. Rather than heroes,
the youth of society instead worship anti-heroes, people who shun the heroic urge. Id.
at 5-8.
64

As one commentator has noted:
Today, that confusion between the realms of nature and choice
continues to plague efforts to develop a sensible health-care system.
Nowhere is it more evident than in our attitudes toward medicine
and mortality. As a health-obsessed society, we do not know what
to do with death, other than to try to control it. In all of the debate
about health care, virtually no one has confronted this central
problem: our determination to prolong life has distorted the
mission of American medicine.

Daniel Callahan, Our FearOf Dying, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1993, at 67.
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Rather than constructing a dialogue of death, society hopes that death will be
conquered through a massive research effort.66 Instead of recognizing the
futility of this mission, Americans choose to wage war against death.
The fight against aging shows up in many different ways in our society. From
infomercials hawking return-to-youth products to antibiotics, transplants,
chemotherapy, and the rise of cryogenics, considerable energy and passion is
dedicated to avoiding death and its creeping, inexorable grip. Fighting it at all
costs - never giving up - has become a rallying cry of the new heroism,6 7 which,
if nothing else, has served to obfuscate and distort the narrative of death.68
B. The Miracles of Modern Medicine
Over the past several decades, advancements in modem medicine have
modified the prevailing view of heroism, creating the hope that death can be
denied and beaten in the foreseeable future. The progress in medical
technology, from research discoveries to transplantation to the development of
new techniques, has been nothing short of revolutionary. The discovery and
dissemination of antibiotics, for example, has changed the way medicine is
practiced, 69 as well as Americans' views of doctors. 70 Several of the more
significant scientific advancements are discussed below.
Numerous discoveries have exponentially increased scientific knowledge
about disease. As a result of these discoveries, drug and transplantation
65

Id.

66

0ne pulmonary physician has noted:
AIDS is going to bankrupt the world. The reason why is the concept
of medical futility has been addressed. In the absence of a terminal
condition, the presence of afuiile condition still permits extreme
and extensive medical measures. If you have AIDS and only have
days to live, you can still insist on everything possible being done
and it will be done.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Richard Reid, Baptist Memorial Hospital, in Jacksonville,

Fla. (Feb. 11, 1994).
67

See, e.g., basketball coach Jim Valvano's last public speech before he succumbed to
cancer, in which he stated, "Never give up."
68

1N How WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LiFE's FINAL CHAPTER, surgeon Sherwin B.

Nuland, attempts to "demythologize the process of dying." This demythologizing,
however, misses the point. It is not that society needs to know the details of dying to
better deal with it, but rather society must incorporate the dying process into the
dialogue of the living. Itis important for society to recast its imageof death. Dr. Nuland's
premise that people's curiosity about death will be satiated if they knew the reality of
it just does not seem to be relevant to transforming the death narrative. See generally
NULAND, supranote 6.
69
Dr. David Rothman, Professor of Social Medicine at the Center for the Study of
Society and Medicine at Columbia University Medical School, has suggested that the

increased use of penicillin led to a diminishment of personal service such as house calls.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 131.
70
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 48, at 52.
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techniques have been developed permitting medicine to extend human life. 71
A medical advancement with a tremendous impact on longevity is antibiotics.
There are now more than 100 varieties of antibiotics used to treat lethal diseases,
such as bacterial meningitis and endocarditis, as well as other debilitating
diseases, such as pneumococcal pneumonia, gonorrhea, malaria, and even
strep throat.72
Gene therapy, which involves identifying parts of the human genome73 and
using the information to correct, prevent, or manipulate genetic defects, is an
area of scientific advancement with considerable potential for influencing
longevity. "[Ojnce perfected, [gene therapy] will enable doctors to 'fix' the
genetics diseases .. ..74 Along similar lines, gene therapy is being used in
combination with drug therapy to fight brain cancer.75 This therapy may have
an impact in treating other diseases as well, including muscular dystrophy,
heart disease, hemophilia, and AIDS.
Organ transplantation is another area in which medical science has
advanced dramatically. Once unknown, now more than 16,000 solid-organ
transplants occur annually in the United States. 76 Ninety percent of those
patients who receive an organ transplant survive for at least one year and fifty
percent survive for more than five years. 77
Discoveries several decades old have become refined and an accepted part
of the medical culture. Dialysis, for example, has become a widely used medical
treatment.78 Dialysis machines can be used in treating hereditary disorders,
71See infra note 91 and text accompanying.
72Recently, antibiotics have been used in the fight against cancer. Scientists have
discovered "magic bullets," also known as monoclonal antibodies, which are like
'biological guided missiles specially designed to zero in on cancer cells." Injected
through chemotherapy, these "bullets" can fight cancer cells or even a tumor by enlisting
the assistance of white blood cells. Bill Lawren, Miracle Cures That May Save Your Life,

FAMILY CIRCLE, Feb. 1994, at 48. Additionally, certain kinds of bacteria-fighting
antibiotics can slow the development of new cancer cells by preventing the growth of
new blood vessels.
73
The human genome comprises the approximately 100,000 genes located within
human DNA. This gene system is accountable for much of the way humans are,
including the susceptibility to and the occurrence of numerous diseases.
74
Jeff Miller, Gene Therapy:What It Is and How ItSaves Lives, GOODHOUSEKEEPING, June
1993, at 201. There is hope that gene therapy may be used to cure such diseases as cystic
fibrosis and melanoma. Id.
75
Lawren, supranote 72, at 48.
76

John A. Robertson, Spare Parts:Organ Replacements in American Society, SCIENCE,

Jan. 1, 1993, at 109 (book review).
77
This technique is not without its costs. Transplants are expensive and go to a
relatively small number of candidates while many others die waiting for a transplant.
Id. at 110.
78Dialysis is most commonly known as a substitute for the human kidney because
it fulfills the function of filtering toxins out of the blood.
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high blood pressure, and diabetes. Today, about 170,000 Americans receive
some form of dialysis treatment. 79
Scientific advances also have permitted the maintenance of life. Machines,
such as ventilators, have the ability to sustain sapient life, even though a person
has no noticeable cognitive functioning. Perhaps most telling about science's
ability to delay death is that as of 1990, approximately 10,000 people in a
persistent vegetative state were being kept alive in the United States by artificial
80
means.
In the past several decades, advances in medicine not only extended life, but
also permitted people to apparently retard the aging process as well. Surgeons
cosmetically change people's appearances to maintain their youthfulness,
drugs such as minoxidol permit the regeneration of hair to overcome baldness,
the drug Retin A has been found to reduce wrinkle,8 1 and techniques such as
liposuction provided instant weight loss.82
C. The Adverse Consequences of Advancing Medical Technology
In reality, Nancy [Cruzan] lay in a bed, contorted with irreversible
muscular and tendon damage, her hands bent so far over that her
fingernails pressed into her wrists. She stared with unseeing eyes,
oblivious to her environment, unable to drink or eat. She was fed
through a tube in her side; another tube carried away waste. Her brain
was atrophying, replaced by a pool of cerebrospinal fluid. Yet, experts
- if this could
indicated that she could have "lived" in this condition
83
have been called "living" - for as long as 30 years.
The advances in modern medicine have had significant and far-reaching
adverse consequences. While these consequences breach disciplinary lines, the
epicenter of the tremors has been the narrative of death. Scientific advances,
by affecting the nature and location of death and even its definition, have
unrealistically expanded society's expectations relating to longevity. When

79

Susan Brink, Dialysis By Numbers, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Feb. 14, 1994, at 58.
1d.

80

81Perhaps one of the most startling attempts at retarding the aging process has
occurred in Beverly Hills, California. There, plastic surgeon William Binder fights
wrinkles by injecting botulinum toxin into facial muscles. Botulinum toxin is better

known as the toxin that causes botulism. This technique is also catching on in other
cities. Mary Roach, Beauty Poison, HEALTH, Jan. 1994, at 68-69.
82

The effort to avoid hair loss, for example, is an approximately two billion dollars

a year industry. Theodore Berland, Baldness "Cures:" Does Anything Really Work?,

CONSUMERS' DIGEST, July 1993, at 68. The motivation to spend this money lies in "feelings
that baldness makes them look older and in physical and sexual decline. Id.
83

FRED H. CATE & BARBARA GILL, THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (1991).

ACr:
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combined with the removal of death from the personal realm, these
expectations have served to solidify the narrative of avoidance.
1. The Promotion of Unrealistic Expectations84
"Our society thinks that with
85 enough time, researchers and computers,
we can know everything."
a. Society's Expectations
86

"Every person has a secret desire to achieve immortality."

Within the past several decades, the concern with youthfulness and
longevity has reached a "fever pitch unknown to previous generations. 87
Society's expectations are fueled by scientific discoveries such as antibiotics,
growth hormones, and human gene therapy.
The preoccupation of society with immortality manifests itself in a myriad
of ways. It includes surgery, special diets, and the resurgence of cryogenics,
which involves freezing a body until such a time that a discovery for endless
life would be possible. In the introduction to The Prospect of Immortality, the
author stated: "Most of us now breathing have a good chance of physical life
after death - a sober, scientific probability of revival and rejuvenation of our
frozen bodies" 88 The book concluded with the following alluring assertion:
'With your active co-operation, the next death in your family need not be
permanent."89

84 Cf. "[Tihe principal task of civilization, its actual raison d'etre, is to defend us
against nature .... [But) no one is under the illusion that nature has already been
vanquished; and few dare hope thaty she will ever be entirely subjected to man."
SIGMUND FREUD, FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 11-12.
85
James D. Davis, Life's Journey:An Un-Power Trip?, FT.LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTNEL,
Apr. 13,1994, at El.
86
Stephen Powelson, seventy-six years old, in response to inquiries as to why he
memorized the 600 pages of Homer's llliad. Id. at A-1.

87

NULAND, supra note 6, at 86.

[W]hy do we persist in heretofore-vain attempts to live beyond
the possible? Why cannot we reconcile ourselves to the immutable
pattern of nature? Although recent decades have seen our concern
with our bodies and their longevity reach a fever pitch unknown to
previous generations, these kinds of hopeful seekings have always

motivated at least some members of those societies that have left
records of their existence.
Id.
88

BOWKER,supra note 11, at 4.
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The unrealistic expectations about the potential for extended life are
promoted by many segments of society. 90 From advertisers to medical
consumers, the desire for extended life is used as an alluring - and realistic possibility. It is almost as if America is addicted to medicine - the more it gets,
the more it craves. 91 As one writer suggested, the desire for immortality may
be the last bastion of omnipotence. 92 These expectations are not necessarily
medicine-specific and may be endemic of a more general malaise - a societal
narcissism.9
While hope of overcoming certain death from the hepatitis B virus has been
created by several baboon-to-human liver transplants, the disappointing
length and quality of life resulting from the transplant has arguably
undermined its propriety. 94 Further, the belief that antibiotics would eradicate
infectious disease has been illusory.95 In 1992 alone, drug resistant strains of
bacteria accounted for 13,300 hospital deaths. %
In fact, the oversubscription of antibiotics by doctors has apparently
propelled the growing number of drug-resistant strains of bacteria. 97 The more

90According to Roy Porter, a medical historian, the problem with medical extensions
of human longevity result from "the price of progress and its attendant unrealistic
expectations." George F. Will, Facing the Scope Beneath the Skin of Life, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
7, 1994, at 74.
91

"Medicine has become a prisoner of its success. As the Western World becomes
healthier, it craves more medicine until... medicine's mandate becomes muddled.
Medical maximization becomes a patient's right and a doctor's duty." Id.
92
"Wanting to live forever is the castle keep of the mind, its last domain of
omnipotence. Strange, how all that is left of castles is their decayed battlements." K.
BRADFORD BROWN, SIGNS OF LIFE 124 0990),
93
Yet, alternatives exist. Dr. Leon Kass says that children are 'life's answer to
mortality, and their presence in one's home is a constant reminder that one no longer
belongs to the frontier generation." Will, supranote 90, at 74.
94

The Chief of the Transplant Division at the University of Pittsburgh, where several
such transplants have occurred, commented on the first one, saying, "We were on the
border of success." R. Davis, Ethics, Surgery Collide, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 12, 1993, at 3A
(quoting Dr. John Fung). The University is committed to such transplants because
"[miore and more people are dying needlessly," according to hospital president Jeffrey
Romoff. Id. Approximately 2,500 people die each year while waiting for an organ
transplant. Of those, 500 or so are waiting for liver transplants. Id.
95

"lndeed, it looks like medicine declared victory and went home too soon. Every
disease-causing bacterium now has versions that resist at least one of medicine's
100-plus antibiotics. Some resist all but one ..

accounts for one in seven new cases .
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1994, at 47.

.

. Drug-resistant tuberculosis now

Sharon Begley, The End of Antibiotics,

96

1d. (based on information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in
Atlanta, Georgia).
97

"Antibiotic usage has stimulated evolutionary changes unparalleled in recorded
biologic history." Id.
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antibiotics are prescribed, 98 the opportunity for resistant strains to develop and
spread increases. 99 Drug-resistant strains of bacterium breed and multiply in
ingenious manners, sharing their resistance with unrelated microbes as well as
passing it on to up to 16,777,220 "offspring" within one twenty-four hour
period. 100 Far from being a panacea that removes disease from the human
realm, scientific discoveries such as antibiotics often lull humans into false
perceptions about the ability of science to deny or delay mortality.
The utilization of many of these scientific discoveries in one location, the
hospital, has fueled unrealistic expectations. If a person returns from the
hospital, survival is often attributed to the special treatment received there. If
a person dies in the hospital, it is all too easy to believe that science was simply
not strong enough this time in the war against disease - certainly not that the
science did not delay (or even cause) the death that resulted.
Thus, expectations about longevity and aging have been consistently unmet.
While science supported predictions of the elimination of infectious diseases
in our lifetime, 101 the emergence of AIDS and the proliferation of cancer,
coupled with the growing number of drug-resistant strains of bacteria, have
sadly proven those predictions wrong. As fast as scientists are discovering
cures to existing diseases, new illnesses, strains of existing diseases, or
resistances are occurring. The unrealized expectations, however, rather than
disappearing, have simply become hardened and rigidified, as if the new
heroism denying death will someday be proven correct. Thus, the vigil in
believing that science can and will unlock the door to longevity in the near
future remains.

98

Significantly, antibiotics are ingested as a result of more than just medical
prescription. Animals are given numerous antibiotics, which are passed on in their meat
and milk. While milk is permitted to carry traces of up to eighty antibiotics, compliance
is questionable due to inadequate enforcement. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
sets limits on how much of the eighty antibiotics milk can contain, and insists that the
less than 1%of milk that violates these limits is dumped. But a 1992 study by Congress'
General Accounting Office found that states test for only four of the federally regulated
antibiotics. The GAO's own tests discovered traces of sixty-four antibiotics at levels "that
raise health concerns:" they could produce resistant germs in milk drinkers. In a recent
study at Rutgers University, antibiotics at levels deemed safe by the FDA increased the
rate at which resistant bacteria emerged by 600 to 2,700. Id. at 48-49.
99
The bacteria practice resisting the antibiotic until a mutation occurs and the
antibiotic is neutralized. "The more widely you use these newer antibiotics, the greater
the chances that [bacteria] will develop resistance," states Dr. David Kessler,
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. Dr. Frank Rhame, director of
infection control at the University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic, adds, "If I use an
antibiotic too much, I'm making it less useful for everyone." GeoffreyCowley, Too Much
ofa Good Thing, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28,1994, at 50.

100Begley, supra note 95, at 48.
Dr. Thomas Beam of the Buffalo, N.Y. VA Medical Center asserted, 'The perception
[in the 1980s] was that we had conquered almost every infectious disease." Id. at 47.
101
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b. Medicine's Expectations
While unrealistic expectations about prolonged life have been created by
society's refusal to direct its attention to its own mortality, the medical culture
must also receive its share of the blame. As Senator John C. Danforth stated:
More and more it is arguable that [doctors] play God by subjecting
people to unwanted and sometimes unnecessary treatment, treatment
that unnaturally prolongs the dying process. Our health care system
has become obsessed with extending life, at times neglecting the caring
component of medicine and trampling on the rights of patients.
The doctor has become less a care-taker than a healer, a conqueror of disease.
The ready access to antibiotics, for example, almost invited doctors to
overprescribe such drugs 103 if those drugs prolonged life. According to Dr.
Sheldon Nuland, a surgeon, medicine has been overwhelmed by its own
hubris.
It has lost humility in the face of the inexorable and still superior power of
nature. Instead, medicine still believes in the "fantasy of controlling nature."104
This lack of humility is arguably one result of the arduous nature of medical
training. The socialization of medical students, who work extremely longhours
and face death on a regular basis, likely contributes to the loss of humility in
the medical culture. 105 This loss, characterized by a corresponding
overestimation of a doctor's power over life, fuels the increased expectations.
2. The Removal of Death From the Personal Realm
Rick was only 40, a nice, funny guy, a good husband, a dedicated
lawyer, a father of a little boy who needs him. He didn't "choose death";
he wanted desperately to live, but a brain tumor was killing him and
the doctors couldn't do106
a thing. He had only one choice: die in the
hospital or die at home.

102 CATE & GILL, supra note 83, at 5 (quoting Senator John C. Danforth (R-Mo)).
103 Cowley, supra note 99, at 50. ("The misuse of antibiotics isn't a new problem. Since
the 1970s, various studies have concluded that fifty to sixty percent of all outpatient
prescriptions are inappropriate ....Americans like quick fixes and when a doctor
doesn't offer one, they look for a doctor who will.")
104Will, supra note 90, at 74 (quoting Dr. Sherwin Nuland).
105

See, e.g., E. Rosenthal, How Doctors Learn to Think They're Doctors, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
14,1994, (Living Section), at 1. ("Doctors feel special because their experiences set them
apart ....
Some doctors say the rigors of training actually squelched their humanity, by
forcing them to operate in a high-stress atmosphere where compassion, patience and
giving are not high priorities." Id. at 1, 5).
10 6 Anne Ricks Sumers, M.D., I Want to Die at Home, NEWSWEEK Apr. 4,1994, at 14.
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The modem death, as compared to the deaths of the 1800s which generally
took place at home, in private, before one's loved ones, most often occurs in a
hospital, hospice or nursing home. Out of the approximately two million
people who die in the United States each year, 80% die in hospitals. 107 Of those
who die in hospitals, 70% die after a decision has been made not to pursue
life-sustaining treatment. 108
The role of the hospital in near-death treatment has been significant. It has
contributed to a change in the location and style of death, from a personal and
symbolic transition from life, to an impersonal, foreign, and often protracted
failed rescue of an organism. No longer is death part of a cultural or familial
ritual led by the dying person. No longer is there a regular ceremonial
observance, celebrating the life of the honoree by family members and
friends.109 Instead, death has become a "technical" occurrence, something to be
marked and observed after it has been duly recorded by the appropriate
medical professional. In the hospital culture,1n 0 death is public, more
impersonal, and subject to numerous intrusions of privacy at any point in
time. 111
The removal of death to the hospital has served to sustain the belief that
death need not be a part of life in modem times. If it is neither seen nor heard
from, and youthful appearances can be maintained by people in their fifties
and sixties, then the denial of death may be readily inferred by those wishing
to believe so.
Why the substitution of the hospital as a place to die? One dies in the
hospital because the hospital has become the place to receive care
which can no longer be given at home. Previously the hospital had
been a shelter for the poor, for pilgrims; then it became a medical 112
center
where people were healed, where one struggled against death.
107Helene L. Lipton, 256 JAMA 1164, 1168 (1986). In 1949, only 50% of the deaths
occurred in hospitals; in 1958 it was 61%, and in 1977 the figure was 70%. NULAND, supra
note 6, at 255.
108Lipton, supra note 107, at 1168.
109 Says Phillipe Aries:
Death in the hospital is no longer the occasion of a ritual ceremony,
over which the dying person presides amidst his assembled relatives
and friends. Death is a technical phenomenon obtained by a cessation
of care, a cessation determined in a more or less avowed way by a
decision of the doctor and the hospital team. Indeed, in the majority
of cases, the dying person has already lost consciousness.
ARIES, supra note 3, at 89.
110

The hospital culture has its own mission and objectives, sometimes superseding

or clashing with the interests of the state and the patient's autonomy. The strength of
the hospital culture even refracts existing legal rules and principles to adapt them to the
hospital setting.
11

1ARIEs, supra note 3, at 89.

1121d.
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The hospital, by default or design, has thus become the designated supervisor
of death.11 3 Death in the hospital has created more than a simple change in
location - it has fostered a shift in the locus of control over death
decision-making as well. The institutional basis of the hospital
decision-making process has served to streamline the patient's autonomy. In
so doing, the hospital employees became "the masters of death - of the moment
11 4
as well as of the circumstances of death."
It is more than just irony, then, that the hospital environment, designed to
heal diseased persons for their return to society, instead has come to provide
an artificial and unfamiliar place where people go to die. The gleaming metal,
futuristic equipment, and well-intentioned health care providers act as a
double-edged sword - the patients are "separated from reality by the very
biotechnology and professional standards that are meant to return people to a
115
meaningful life."'
Thehospital has served to recreate the death process in other respects as well.
The transcendence of life to death as a logical progression of the state of nature
has become a discordant interregnum of hospital machinery and technology.
Hospital deaths are "too often tangled in webs of wires and tubes in intensive
care units which are ...the purest form of our society's denial of the
naturalness, and even the necessity, of death!"116 The wires and tubes
symbolize the artificiality of the hospital environment, but perhaps even more
significantly, the fact that the patient no longer needs or is dependent on family
and friends. 117 In this last stage of life, humans are sustained completely by
1 8
machinery. 1
1 13

1d.

114Id.
115NuLAND,supra note 6, at 254.
ll6Will, supra note 90, at 74 (quoting Dr. Sherwin Nuland).
117

As Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said:
Our civilization cannot endure unless we, as individuals, realize
our personal responsibility to and dependence on the rest of the
world. For it is literally true that the self-supporting man or woman
has become as extinct as Stone Age man. Without the help of others,
everyone of us would die, naked and starved.
J. Zentner, Healing Springs, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 27,1994, atJ4.
ll 8 See, e.g., NuLAND, supra note 6.

By and large, dying is a messy business... [a]nd even for those who
do achieve a measure of serenity during separation, the period of
days and weeks preceding the decline of full awareness is frequently
glutted with mental suffering and physical distress. Too often,
patients and their families cherish expectations that cannot be met,
with the result that death is made all the more difficult by frustration and disappointment with the performance of the medical community that may be able to do no better - or, worse yet, does no
better because it continues to fight long after death has become
inevitable. In the anticipation that the great majority of people die
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By gaining such control over the modem death process, and removing it
from the realm of the personal, the hospital has profoundly affected society's
death narrative. When death moved to the hospital, so did the "sights and
smells that in the early nineteenth century were part of daily life, along with
suffering and illness. The physiological effects have passed from daily life to
the aseptic world of hygiene, medicine and morality."11 9 Passing away along
with the physiological experience of death was its narrative, particularly that
of the good death.
3. The Nature of Death
120
"Death keeps taking little bits of me."

In many ways, the nature of death for human beings has not changed over
the millennium. The maximum life expectancy has not increased 121 and there
has been no solid evidence that a drug or elixir exists which will reverse the
inevitable process of aging.122 Death still occurs in a common manner for all.
Atherosclerosis, infections such as pneumonia, strokes and other diseases, in
conjunction with the aging process, sap the body of life. As Dr. Milton Helpern,
Chief Medical Examiner of New York City, stated, "Death may be due to a wide
variety of diseases and disorders, but in every case the underlying
23
physiological cause is a breakdown in the body's oxygen cycle."'1
Yet, for all that death remains the same, subtle but powerful changes in the
nature of death have been evoked by scientific advances in recent decades.
Because medicine has been able to prolong the last stages of life, sometimes for
years, the motion picture version of death as one great cataclysmic event is less
valid than at any point in history. Instead:
Death has been dissected, cut to bits by a series of little steps which
finally makes it impossible to know which step was the real death, the
one in which consciousness was lost, or the one in which breathing
stopped. All these little silentdeaths have replaced and erased the great
dramatic act of death, and no one any longer has the strength or

peacefully in any event, treatment decisions are sometimes made
near the end of life that propel a dying person willy-nilly into a series
of worsening miseries from which there is no extrication ....
Id. 142-143.
119Id. at 255 (quoting Aries).

120Id. at 67 (quoting an elderly patient of Chicago physician Walter Alvarex, after
suffering a series of small strokes).
121NuLAND, supra note 6, at 85.
122

d. at 86.
at 67 (quoting Dr. Milton Helpern).

123 1d.
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a period of weeks or a moment which has lost a
patience to wait over
124
part of its meaning.
A striking example of the confrontation between mortality and a protracted
dying process supported by modem medicine involves the disease AIDS. The
lives of those suffering from AIDS can be extended temporarily, and the quality
of life apparently improved incrementally through the administration of a
variety of drugs and treatment modalities. 125 Yet, this disease confronts
persons with a choice in the nature and circumstances of death, and of the
narrative to be used about that death. The current treatment of AIDS is
ill-equipped to dispose of questions about the value of life in a diminished
form.
The nature of death is also greatly affected by the cost of health care. New
medical technology is often expensive, and the demand for it outstrips the
supply.1 26 For many people, the medical technology that could save or improve
their lives exists, but is simply not affordable. This is most obvious in areas such
as organ transplants, dialysis, and expensive tests, such as magnetic resonance
imaging, or other treatments. 127 The concept of health care rationing, far from
being a hypothetical subject of academic discourse, has become a guiding factor
in the decision-making of health care institutions as well as practicing
physicians.
The removal of death to the hospital, with ready access to technology, has
impacted on the nature of death as well. The hospital death has allowed the
concentration of resources to prolong the dying process, has permitted the
hospital to control the appearance of the patient in his or her last hours, and
has provided the hospital with greater authority over the timing of death. The
hospital death has, in short, complicated the dying process:
Once short, incurable diseases are now protracted terminal illnesses
fraught with ethical, legal, spiritual, medical, and economic decisions.
The dying patient often ends up bound in soft restraints and gagged
limbo, while medical and legal
by the endotracheal tube, lying mute in128
options clash by twilight over his bed.

124

ARIES, supra note 3, at 88-89.

125Currently, the treatment of this disease includes the use of drugs such as AZT and

ddl. Although these drugs do not cure the disease, they do retard the rate at which the
virus spreads. Various drugs such as rifabutin and pyrimethamine are used to treat the
side effects of AIDS that can include lung ailments which mimic tuberculosis and
meningitus.
126 Many people die waiting for an organ transplant, for example, and many others
do not have access to health care that can detect or treat disease in an early stage.
127 The average cost of a liver transplant, for example, is between $175,000 and
$225,000. Davis, supra note 94, at 3A.
128

Richard P. Dooling, Damage Actions for Non-Consensual Life Sustaining Medical

Treatment, 30 ST. Louis L.J. 895, 896 (1986).
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These changes have contributed to the paradox of the nature of the modem
death - while death is to be avoided in modem society, it has become a more
protracted and larger part of the life cycle. The paradox is reinforced by the
extension of the death process as there is more time to contemplate the prospect
of death. The process has become more surreal, particularly for the majority of
Americans who die in hospitals. These persons are "likely to meet their end
: . .,in a sedated or comatose state; betubed nasally, abdominally and
intravenously; and far more like manipulated objects than like moral
29
subjects."'1
III. THE LEGAL APPARATUS

The law's response to advances in life-sustaining technology has developed
along two fronts: reexamining the legal conception of death and setting up a
framework where patients and the medical culture can negotiate a satisfactory
course of treatment regarding the provision of life-sustaining measures.
A. Defining and Redefining Death:The Blurringof the Bright Line
"If technology has blurred the traditional distinction between a man
alive and a man dead, then there is an urgent and pressing reason to
restore clarity." David Lamb, Death, Brain Death, and Ethics.
The fallout from medical progress in extending life has reached legal
death-related epistemology.130 The numerous instances of persons residing in
or near a persistent vegetative state has created "a vast gray area between
traditional notions of life and death." 131
Historically, there was no significant debate about the definition of death,
since the two major systems responsible for life, the cardiac and respiratory
systems, would cause the body to fail if they themselves failed. That is, when
the heart and lungs failed, the whole organism seemed to die at once. The
difficulty began to arise with the creation of artificial support systems for the
heart and lungs. When that occurred, the death of the human being became
more fragmented, and much more difficult to define.
1. Traditional Definitions of Death
Black's Law Dictionary defines death as "the cessation of life; permanent
cessation of all vital functions and signs the ceasing to exist; defined by
physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation
of the animal and vital function consequent thereupon, such as respiration,

129

CATE & GILL, supra note 83, at 6.

130

"Contrary to the President's Commission, human death is hardly the 'one great

certainty.'" KAREN G. GERVAIS, REDEFINNG DEATH 216 (1986).
131Dooling, supra note 128, at 896.
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pulsation...
"132 The dictionary definition focuses on the cardiac function,
while other definitions differ.133 One of the most widely used definitions of
death is from the 1968 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School designated to examine the definition of brain death. 134 The Harvard
Criteria defined death based on various characteristics of a person in an
irreversible coma, meaning a person who has a permanently non-functioning
brain. 13 5 Several or all of the Criteria'scharacteristics may exist, however, with
reversible brain losses caused by such things as drug intoxication and
hypothermia. 136 Doctors must rule out these distinguishable causes before
pronouncing death.
2. Redefining Death
In the face of a protracted dying process caused by advancements in medical
technology and greater ambiguity as to when life precisely ends, many
commentators have argued for a change in the legal definition of death. The
costs of perpetuating ambiguity on a societal and personal level are simply too
great:
[d]eath has become a great uncertainty for us, at both the conceptual
and public policy levels. Some uncertainties are tolerable; others are
not. Since dying and death are sources of the deepest, most intractable
anguish humans can suffer, uncertainty here is morally intolerable,
for
137
it promises only to compound that anguish, not diminish it.
The uncertainty associated with the modem death is compounded by the
lack of sufficient rhetoric to describe the death process. "The technology of
132

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (6th ed. 1990).

33

1 For one commentator, death requires three separate conditions: "Death is
irreversible cessation of all of the following: (1) total cerebral function, (2) spontaneous
function of the respiratory system, and (3) spontaneous function of the circulatory
system." GERVAIS, supra note 130, at 26 (quoting Halley & Harvey).
134

1d. at 6.

35

1 These characteristics include:
1. Total unresponsiveness and unreceptivity. This means that the person is totally
unaware of her or his surroundings and does not respond to painful stimuli.
2. No movements of spontaneous breathing for three minutes while off the
respirator, which means that all spontaneous movements, spontaneous respiration, and
responses to pain, touch, sound and light have ceased.
3. No reflexes. Pupils will not dilate; eyes will not turn when the head is turned;
and tendon flexes no longer exist.
4. Flat e.e.g. (electo encephalogram) for at least ten minutes and no evidence of
any electrical activity in the brain.
5. No change in the results of the test repeated at least 24-hours later.
BURNELL, supra note 41, at 69.
136

1d.

137

GERVAIS, supra note 130, at 216.
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life-support systems is so new, that little clear and subtle language exists
concerning life-prolonging procedures and their application." 138
Alternative standards attempt to create more predictability and stability in
the occurrence of death. Standards such as the permanent loss of consciousness
have been proposed.139 This standard, for example, intends to treat the human
as "person" and not simply as an "organism".140 Yet, why is consciousness the
standard? Is not an unconscious person clearly alive? Is there really finality
associated with an "irreversible" loss of consciousness? The difficulties
illustrated by this proposed alternative standard of death involve which set of
criteria are to shape and define the definition - those that are biological, those
that are moral, those that are ontological or those that are metaphysical?141
Many other inquiries and proposals have been advanced. According to
Robert S. Morison, for example, the conceptualization of death is widely mis-

138 Note, The Living Will: Preservation of the Right-to-Die Demands Clarity and
Consistency, 95 DICK. L. REv. 209, 215 (Fall 1990).
13 9 States one commentator:
The brain-death criterion commits us to a redefinition of our concept
of human death, a redefinition that involves a shift of perspective
from the human as organism to the human as person. We ought to
be concerned about the death of the person in declaring death. I have
developed an ontological argument in the form of a conservative
mentalist personal identity theory showing that personal existence
ceases with the permanent cessation of consciousness. Since the persistence of consciousness must be considered the sine qua non of
human personal life, the brain-death criterion, as well as the neocortical-death criterion or any criterion whose fulfillment is conclusively associated with persistent vegetative existence, is justified.
GERVAIS, supra note 130, at 215-216.
1401d.
141Various commentators have used this question to pose additional inquiries:
IT]he death of a person does not coincide with the cessation of all
biological activity in the organism, or "biological death," even in
the case of the traditional criteria; and ... the use of any criterion
for declaring death rests on a decision of significance, that is, a
decision concerning the features that humans must possess to be
regarded as living persons rather than dead persons. Since the
death of a person does not coincide with biological death, how
is the death of a person to be conceptualized - as a biological
event, or as a metaphysical and moral one? Should the death
of a human being be construed as a biological event, subject to
biological inquiry into the permanent change in the status
of the organism? Or should it be considered an essentially nonorganismic event in the life of a person, so that personal death
will be irreversible loss of those features we take to be necessary
for personal existence?
Id. at 5-6.
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used. 142 Morison suggests that death is not so much as a single, solitary event,
but a continuous process of "growth and decay."14 In essence, once a life is
created, it is in the process of dying.
The protraction of the dying process has prompted suggestions for a more
radical reformation of the definition of death. 144 These revisions are predicated
on the belief that a human life is characterized by a continuing personality and
intellectual function:
At the heart of that debate is the philosophical and psychological issue
of whether we remain the same person, legally and morally,
throughout our earthly existence, or whether there are psychological
and intellectual transformations of such magnitude and import that
when they take place, it legitimately can be concluded that the former
1
person has ceased to exist and a new person has come into being.'4
The leading proponent of this modified definition of death is philosopher
Derek Parfit. 146 According to Parfit, there is effectively no unitary, continuous,
and identifiable self-persisting during the entirety of a person's life. The
discontinuity occurs when a threshold level of psychological continuity ceases
to exist 147 A person in a persistent vegetative state is not experiencing joy,
satisfaction, love, or pleasure - these are permanently absent. Therefore, the
organism's "life" is without benefit. 148

142
Morison calls it a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness. ..
" (i.e., regarding or using
an abstraction as if it were a thing). Robert S. Morison, Death: Process or Event? 173
SCIENCE 694 (1971).
143

Morison adds that a particularly frequent hazard is the:
[Ulse of abstractions to introduce artificial discontinuities into
what are essentially continuous processes ....
Clearly we are
dealing here with a continuous process of growth and decay.
There is no magic moment at which "everything" disappears.
Death is no more a single, clearly delimited, momentary
phenomenon than is infancy, adolescence, or middle age.
Id. at 694-695.
144

[Slince each of us has a particular personal identity consisting
in a particular set of psychological traits, the assertion, "Patient
Jones is still alive" implies both that "the patient is alive" and that
"the patient is [remains] Jones." In other words, the patient retains
that set of psychological traits we have always associated with
Jones ....
The circumstances in which the patient is alive, yet
Jones is dead, is an uncomfortable one.
GERVAIS, supranote 130, at 113.
145
Ben A. Rich, The Values History:A New Standardof Care, 40 EMORY L.J.1109,1122-23
(1991).
146See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
147

1d. at 205-06, 223-26.

148

Rebecca Dressier, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 428-30 (1990).
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If Parfit's analysis is followed, when a person's psychological continuity
courses below a certain threshold level, a new personal identity exists,
permitting differential treatment of that individual. This analysis has great
implications for the legal and ethical approach to death. It permits a person in
a persistent vegetative state, whose personality is permanently destroyed, to
be declared legally dead. 149 This approach provides a philosophical basis for
declaring death for a person in a persistent vegetative state. It supplements a
growing unease about where to draw the line in declaring death.150 Depending
on the laws of the jurisdiction, it also permits an inference that the person does
not wish to continue in such a state.151 In essence, those advocating such a
neocortical standard of death are effectively arguing that a more "direct and
intellectually honest approach to terminating treatment of such patients may
be to define them as dead. 152
Parfit's modified definition of death has its own attendant problems,
including questions relating to the measurement of neocortical death - how
certain is such a standard and is it really an improvement,153 the fluctuation in
149This uncertainty is anathema to the orderly progression from life into death, even
raising the specter of undignified death.
150

As one commentator noted:
Once neocortical death has been unequivocally established and
the possibility of any recovery of consciousness and intellectual
activity thereby excluded, the question must be asked, although
the patient breathes spontaneously, is he or she alive?... In
essence, it seems that a person who resumes spontaneous respiration after cardiac arrest, yet exhibits an isoelectric EEG, is to be
regarded as "alive" while another surviving the same accident,
also with an isoelectric EEG but whose cardiac function depends
upon mechanical ventilation, may be regarded as "dead." Clearly
this distinction between "alive" and "dead" attaches cardinal importance to the function of respiration and none to those higher
functions of the nervous system that demarcate man from the
lower primates and all other vertebrates and invertebrates.
GERVAIS, supra note 130, at 13 (quoting Brierley, et al).
151If the exact point of death can not be clearly fixed, should the patient's intent play
a greater role in the determination? A significant question in the corollary epistemology
of patient autonomy arises. In accord with the patient's right to self determination, is a
subjective test appropriate? Many courts have considered a wide variety of evidence in
determining the subjective intent of the patient. Jill Hollander, Note, HealthCareProxies:
New York's Attempt to Resolve the Right to Die Dilemma, 57 BROOK L. REV. 145, 151 at n.29
(Spring 1991).
One commentator suggests that the use of a wide variety of evidence undercuts
the subjective nature of the test and becomes more closely aligned to an objective
analysis. "[T]he point is that even someone critical of an objective standard is in the end
unavoidably drawn to it." Dressler, supra note 148, at 429.
152
Shapiro, supra note 15, at 448.
153

0ne commentator framed the debate as follows:
In order to support [the contention that the persistent vegetative
state is sufficient grounds for the pronouncement of death], there
must be unequivocal certainty, substantiated by medical data and
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the standard that may arise as medical discoveries occur, and the ethical issues
that relate to labeling a breathing human being as functionally dead. 154
It is clear, however, that a predictable and uniform definition of death is a
necessary condition precedent for the legal apparatus to adequately deal with
the death-related decision-making process.1 55 Otherwise, the legal process will
remain handicapped and ineffective.
B. The Constitution and Common Law Response
Advance directives permitting patients to direct health care decision-making
are often predicated on various constitutional and common law rights. These
include a constitutional right to refuse treatment, common law rights in tort,
such as battery and negligence actions, and an emerging theory called
"wrongful life."
1. The Constitutional Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
156
The seminal case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
established a due process right to refuse medical treatment by a person in a
persistent vegetative state. While this 1990 Supreme Court decision was
essentially a case of first impression for the Court, it was preceded by several
157
important lower court decisions.

experience, empirically verifiable, and supported by autopsy studies
confirming the clinical analysis (as currently exists, we believe, for
the total brain death concept),that is no functioning of the cerebral
cortex. Merely a severe degree of disfunctioning is insufficient evidence for pronouncing death. From a medical standpoint, such a
case may be established for a variant of the persistent vegetative
state, viz. "neocortical death."
GERVAS, supra note 130, at 12-13.
154

There appear to be three chief schools in the debate:
those who think that the decision about what constitutes the
death of the person is biological in nature, and therefore requires
a biological argument in its support; those who consider that we
are in realm of the moral, so that our concern is not so much with
what features constitute the death of the person as with the determination of the circumstances under which a person ought to be
declared dead; and those who take the problem to be ontological
or metaphysical in nature, and hence to require the articulation
of an adequate theory of personal identity in its defense.
Id. at 15-16.
155

The "medical and legal professions must strive to provide precise and consistent
terminology so that society can enjoy the benefits of living wills and guard against the
possibility of an undignified death." Note, The Living Will: Preservationof the Right-to-Die
Demands Clarityand Consistency, supra, note 138, at 215.
156

110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).

157

See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2887-88 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting a list
of cases in which the removal of sustaining treatment was allowed); see also Clay v.
Romeo, 697F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987)
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a. Quinlan
Perhaps the most significant antecedent was In re Quinlan,158 decided by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. The case involved Karen Ann Quinlan, a comatose
young woman in a persistent vegetative state. Ms. Quinlan was being kept alive
on a respirator. Her parents petitioned the courts of New Jersey to have the
respirator removed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a right to privacy
existed that included the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This
right was not absolute, however. It had to be balanced against the state's
interest in preserving life. Upon balancing the interests, the court granted the
parents' request to turn Karen's respirator off.159
b. Cruzan
On January 11, 1983, a young woman named Nancy Beth Cruzan, then
twenty five years old, lost control of her car in Jaspar County, Missouri. The car
overturned and Ms. Cruzan was seriously injured. She soon lapsed into a coma
and persistent vegetative state. Consequently, she was implanted with feeding
and hydration tubes. With virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive
abilities, her parents, acting as her co-guardians, sought to remove the artificial
feeding and hydration tubes, leading inevitably to her death. The hospital
refused to disconnect the tubes without a court order. Thus began an odyssey
in the legal system ending with the United States Supreme Court.160
The Court considered whether Ms. Cruzan had a constitutional right to
require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. The Supreme Court
carved out broad rules and principles regarding the constitutional protections
involving a person's right to refuse or withdraw from life-sustaining measures.
The Court held that there was a constitutional right, protected by the term
"liberty" within the due process clause, for a competent person to refuse
life-saving measures, including hydration and nutrition.161 The Supreme
Court went further than some other courts' decisions, whose outcomes were
based solely on common law informed consent principles. Yet, the Court never
explained why it chose the particular locus of the constitutional due process
right in the word "liberty," or why it found that the right extended to those

(en bancy; In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (NJ. 1987);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976),
overruled in part, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985).
158355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).

159Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64, 671-72.
16 0
161

Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845-46.

Ms. Cruzan's father stated after the decision that "Because of Nancy, I suspect
hundreds of thousands of people can rest free, knowing that when death beckons they
can meet it face to face with dignity, free from the fear of unwanted and useless medical
treatment." CATE & GILL, supra note 83, at 6.
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persons who were incompetent to make such a decision. The Court insisted on
restricting the legal analysis to the meaning of liberty in the 14th Amendment,
refusing to extend it to the right to privacy.162
Instead, the Supreme Court recognized that significant competing interests
existed. Because the Court concluded that the choice between life and death
was "a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality"1 63 the
Court also held that a state can constitutionally require a showing of clear and
convincing evidence "to safeguard the personal element of this choice. "164 The
Court did not clarify, however, the precise nature of evidence that would satisfy
such a standard. Specifically, the Court did not opine whether oral testimony
would be sufficient or whether a written statement of intent could be
challenged as deficient. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted
that "the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as refusing life
sustaining treatment." 165
2. The Scope of the Right to Refuse Treatment
While it is well established that a right to refuse medical treatment exists, it
is far less certain whether the right includes a refusal of nutrition and hydration.
In Corbett v. D'Alessandro,166 for example, the court concluded that the right to

162
The Court stated: "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse
treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a 14th
amendment liberty interest." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
concurring, stated that: "Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with
our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protectedby the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Significantly, had the Court held that the locus of the right to refuse medical
treatment was privacy, then it likely would not have permitted the state to impose a
restriction on such a right by requiring clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
wishes.
163
Cruzan, 110 S.Ct at 2852.
164

d. at 2853.

165 This does not mean, however, that a state must impose a clear and convincing
evidence standard; a lesser standard would be permissible. One major problem with
theCruzan decision was not that it recognized the right to die, but that itplaced the right
squarely within the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
According to one commentator:
The problem with identifying his right as a liberty rather than a
privacy interest is that incompetent patients who now have clear
and convincing directives called competent are more likely to have
their treatment determined by physicians and judges because their
autonomy - an essential aspect of their exercise of liberty - cannot
survive incompetence.
Rich, supra note 145, at 1110.
166487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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refuse treatment included the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. 167 The
case involved a seventy-five year old comatose woman being kept alive on a
nasogastric feeding tube. Her husband petitioned the court to remove the tube.
The court concluded that the right to have the tube removed was "a
constitutionally protected right that existed under the circumstances."1 68
Significantly, the court did not differentiate between a nasogastric feeding tube
and other artificial life sustaining measures. 169
In Brophey v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,170 the court concluded that
nutrition was part of the medical treatment that could be permissibly
withdrawn from a patient. Mr. Brophy lay in a persistent vegetative state
following a massive aneurysn. His wife petitioned the court to have the
gastronomy tube providing his nutrition and hydration removed. The trial
court had concluded that the patient had a right to refuse treatment. It added,
however, that the hospital and physician also had a right to refuse to comply
with a request to remove the tube and consequently decided for the hospital.
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the
hospital and physician's right to refuse to comply with the request, but held
that Mr. Brophy should be transferred to a hospital where physicians would
honor the patient's request.171
a. Tort
In addition to the Constitution, tort law has protected a patient's autonomy
in making health care decisions. 172 The common law right of
self-determination, or more specifically, autonomous control over one's body,
was not initially Constitutionally grounded, but rather was based on the laws
of trespass and battery. As Judge Cardozo stated:

167
Id. at 370-72. The Florida statute at that time permitted the withdrawal of life
prolonging procedures even though Mrs. Corbett did not have a living will or health

care advance directive so long as a consultation with a physician occurred and there
was a written agreement with various individuals, including the patient's spouse. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.07.

The court held that Florida's living will statute, section 765.03(3)(b), permitted the

withdrawal of both feeding and hydration, reversing the trial court's decision. Corbett,
487 So. 2d at 370-72.
168 Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 372.
169
d. The court could have viewed the provision of sustenance as different than other
artificial life-sustaining medical treatment.

170497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
171

4d. at 639.

1 72

1n Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.

1977), the court observed thatthestate's interestin savinghuman life where theinfliction
is curable is greater than the state's interest when the issue is not whether life can be
extended, but how long and at what cost to the individual. Id. at 425-26.
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Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
consent commits an
performs an operation without his patient's
73
assault, for which he is liable in damages.
Based on this analysis, the provision of medical treatment generally required
the informed consent of the patient. To ensure informed consent, a patient must
have adequate information to make a decision. To facilitate the free flow of
information, several courts placed a fiduciary duty on medical staff to disclose
information to the patient. This informational interest is considered essential
to a patient's decision-making process. If it is violated, an action in fraud may
arise.
In Estate of Leach v. Schapiro,174 for example, the claimant alleged that the
patient had been placed on life support without consent. The Ohio Court of
Appeals found that a physician had an obligation "to fully inform the patient
of his condition and to obtain the patient's informed consent to the medical
treatment."175 Observed the court:
Because the importance of adequate disclosure increases as the patient
is placed at a greater informational disadvantage, we join those courts
holding that a physician's non-disclosure may give rise to an action in
fraud independent of malpractice.. .[W]e also conclude that when a
patient becomes incompetent the physician's fiduciary obligations
176 of
full disclosure flow to the person acting in the patient's behalf.
The court's mandate of disclosure goes beyond what was required in
Miranda v. Arizona.177 The court's requirement demands affirmative
information, as opposed to warnings, in order for a patient to intelligently
determine his or her care.
b. Interference with the Right to Die
Some courts have found that non-consensual medical treatment may satisfy
the requirements of a tort labeled "wrongful life."178 This tort essentially
involves interference with the right to die. Commentators and courts alike have

173

Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914).

174469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
1751d. at 1052.
1 76

1d. at 1054.

177 What the court has prescribed is functionally equivalent to the warnings

demanded by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
178
See, e.g., Rich, supra note 145, at 1161; Dooling, supra note 128, at 896; A. Samuel

Oddi, The Tort of Interferencewith the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Causeof Action, 75
GEO. L.J. 625 (1986); seealso,e.g., Anderson v. Saint Francis/St. GeorgeHosp., 614 N.E.2d
841 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
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reasoned that autonomy over one's body extends to unwanted life-sustaining
treatment. 179
For example, in Anderson v. Saint Francis/St. George Hosp.,l8O a nurse
resuscitated the patient even though directions had been left to the contrary.
The court concluded that while there must be some legally recognized harm to
recover actual damages, nominal damages may result if a person's life had been
extended by this violation.18 1 In a different case, Estateof Leach v. Shapiro,182 the
court found that a cause of action existed for wrongfully placing and
maintaining a patient on a life support system contrary to her and her family's
expressed wishes and desires. 183
c. Payment Issues
Litigation has arisen over who will pay for continuing treatment when it is
not desired. In Grace Plaza of Great Neck v. Elbaum,184 a husband sued a nursing
home for continuing to keep his wife on a life support system. The husband
refused to pay the medical bills attendant to his wife's treatment. He claimed
that in his surrogate capacity, treatment should have been stopped when he
requested it. The court held for the nursing home. It was not liable for
continuing life-saving medical treatment to a comatose patient over the
objection of the patient's conservator when there was no evidence of an intent
to discontinue treatment. 185
3. Building on the Constitutional and Common Law Framework:
Advance Directives
Although courts have laid the foundation for autonomous patient
decision-making by recognizing a right to refuse medical treatment and
179
For example, "[oince it has been established that a person has the right to die,
medical personnel who might otherwise be under a duty to act on behalf of that person
are not only relieved of that duty but also restrained by a diametrically opposite duty
not to interfere with that person's right to die." Oddi, supra note 178, at 637.

180614 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
181

1d. at 846. The court recognized that non-consensual medical treatment may
constitute a battery.
182469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
183

The court stated:

While the patient's right to refuse treatment is qualified because
it may be overbome by competing state interests, we believe that,
absent legislature to the contrary, the patient's right to refuse treatment is absolute ....We perceive this right as a logical extension
of the consent requirement and conclude that a patient may recover
for a battery if his refusal is ignored.

Id. at 1051-52.
184588 N.Y.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
185

d.
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corollary interests, cases such as Cruzan did not resolve the dilemmas created
by a protracted hospital dying process. In light of the growing uncertainty of
rights and obligations involving death-related treatment decisions, and the
increasing problem of incompetent patients being artificially kept alive with
virtually no realistic prognosis for recovery, many states and the federal
government have passed responsive legislation called advance directives.
These measures permit patients to direct health care decisions in advance of
186
becoming incompetent.
The primary forms of advance directives are living wills and health care
surrogates. Aliving will is a writing that directs health care decisions, including
palliative care, under specific circumstances. 187 A durable health care power of
attorney, (i.e. a health care proxy or surrogate), is a more expansive measure,
one that authorizes another person to make health care decisions for the
principal. 188 The durable health care power of attorney operates when patients
become incompetent. 189 These devices allow individuals to maintain control
over the treatment provided at the end of their life.
Today, all fifty states 190 permit some form of advance directives by case law
or statute. Congress also has enacted a general law in the area, the 1991 Patient

186

The controlling statutes do not permit, however, active euthanasia, meaning an act
that terminates or shortens life. Such euthanasia questions have also reached the courts,
most notably in the case of Dr. Jack Kervorkian, who has engaged in a variety of highly
publicized physician-assisted suicides. Euthanasia, however, is not the subject of this
paper.
187
A living will, for example, is described as "a written declaration.., stating a
declarant's desire for medical care or non-care, including palliative care, and other
related matters such as organ donation and body disposal." TENN. CODE ANN. §
32-11-103(4) (1995).
188
For example, this instrument "authorizes an attorney in fact to make health care
decisions for the principal." IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(4) (1993).
189
For example, one state defines the proxy as "a person eighteen (18) years old or
older appointed by the patient as attorney-in-fact to make health care decisions
including the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment if a qualified
patient, in the opinion of the attending physician, is permanently unconscious,
incompetent, or otherwise mentally or physically incapable of communication." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-17-201(10) (Michie 1993).
190
For example, North Dakota has adopted the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act, based on the legislative intent that every competent adult has a right to control
decisions relating to the adult's own medical care. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (1993).
California has adopted The Natural Death Act, which provides that "an adult
person has the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of
his or her own medical care, including the decision to have life-sustaining treatment
withheld or withdrawn". CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 7185.5(A) (1993).
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Self Determination Act.19 1 According to one of the bill's sponsors, 192 the Act
supplies "people with information so that they can decide their own fate
....."193 The purpose of the federal law is similar to the purpose of the various
state laws. This law co-exists with, but does not supersede, those state laws.
Questions have been raised about the value of advance directives. These
inquiries were posed almost as soon as the measures were adopted.1 94 For
example, it has been contended that people do not understand how advance
directives work, including those persons who use them.195 Further, it has been
claimed that even when people are aware of advance directives, they are
hesitant to deal with issues of death in the personal realm. 196 It also has been
asserted that an advance directive adopted at a fixed time and place does not
adequately take into account changes over time in either the patient's medical
condition or attitude about treatment decisions. Additionally, there is no
evidence of hospitals and treating health care providers actually complying
with the wishes expressed in a signed advanced directive. Finally, including
information about advance directives as part of a packet of forms upon
admission to a hospital or health care facility is problematic for several reasons.
It is the wrong time to present such information given the stresses and pressures
of being admitted to a hospital. Also, furnishing information on advance
directives along with numerous other forms obscures the special importance
19 7
of the advance directive mechanism.

191
The law went into effect on December 1, 1991. 42 USCS § 1395cc(f) (Law. Co-op.
1991).
192
Senator Danforth, (R-Mo.), co-sponsored the bill with Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (D-N.Y.).
193

CATE & GILL, supra note 83, at 3 (quoting Senator John C. Danforth). Proclaimed

Senator Danforth, "Let's let people have the dignity of deciding what they want and

what they don't want." Id.
194

Although patients may make theirpreferences known through any of the [advance
directives] described above, these methods are rarely used due to lack of public
awareness and sophistication and the reluctance of patients to deal with issues
concerning their own deaths. Id.
195

Yuen, supra note 24, at 595.

196

See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS INMEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 2 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE
ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER
RELATIONSHIP, 241-42 (1982) (36% of individuals surveyed gave instructions about how

they wanted to be treated regarding their eventual incapacity to make health care
decisions; 23% of the people surveyed put such requests in writing); see also Yuen, supra
note 24, at 595 ("although patients may make their preferences known through any of
the three methods described above, these methods are rarely used due to lack of public
awareness and sophistication and the reluctance of patients to deal with issues
concerning their own deaths").
197

CATE & GILL, supra note 83, at 22-23.
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Yet, advance directives are still considered by many to be the most
appropriate response to continually advancing medical technology. The two
major types of directives, living wills and health care proxies, are given more
careful scrutiny below.
C. The Legislative Response
1. Living Wills
Living will statutes vary from state to state.198 Many living wills statutes
apply only in cases involving terminal illness or a persistent vegetative state. 199
There are numerous problems associated with living wills which arguably
undermine their efficacy. Living wills are too often dependent on specific
circumstances that cannot cover the many permutations that may arise.200 For
example, living wills generally do not cover all forms of treatment, but rather
pertain only to "life-sustaining procedures. 201 This coverage appears to be
unduly narrow in scope. Also, living wills attempt to install firm rules of
treatment when broader principles would be preferable.20 2
Another significant difficulty is that many living wills statutes generally
become operative only if there is a terminal condition. An initial question is
whether such a condition is definable. The medical profession disagrees on its

198

See Christopher J.Condie, Comparison of the Living Wills Statutes of the Fifty States,
14J. CoNTEMP. L. 105 (1988); Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The FirstDecade, 1987
WIs. L. REv. 737; SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAwS (1987).
For example, in 1976, California adopted the "Natural Death Act." This Act provided

both civil and criminal immunity to health care providers who abided by living wills.
199

The cases that have resulted in litigation have mostly concerned patients who are
in a persistent vegetative state. Elizabeth D. McLean, Comment, Living Will Statutes in
Light of Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Dept. of Health:Ensuring That a Patient'sWishes Will
Prevail, 40 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1317 at n.56 (1991).
200As one commentator has noted:
Living wills drafted pursuant to existing statutes are problematic;
even if directives are executed properly, they cannot cover all of
the circumstances in which a patient may want to refuse treatment
because the statutes are not complete. Ambiguities in the statutes
cause clarity gaps in the living wills that later may be subject to court
interpretation. In order for an average adult to provide clear and
convincing evidence of his intentions, he must have a living will
that thoroughly covers foreseeable contingencies.
Id. at 1318.
201
See e.g., CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODES, § 71.87(c) (West 1990).
202
Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop commented about the Karen Ann
Quinlan situation: 'There is no way that there can be a set of rules to govern this
circumstance. Guidelines perhaps are possible, but not rules." Paul W. Armstrong & B.
D. Colen, FromQuinlanto lobes: The Courtsand thePVS Patient,THE HASTINGS CTR. REPORT
at 37, 40 (Feb./Mar. 1988).
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meaning.203 Some observers suggest that terminal illness can be confused with
a chronic, progressive disease. Along a somewhat similar vein, it also is
arguable that there is no scientifically valid standard for measuring terminal
illness.20 4
An illustration of this problem involved a woman named Estelle Browning,
a Florida resident who executed a living will in November of 1985. In her living
will, Mrs. Browning stated, "Ido not desire that, nutrition and hydration (food
and water) be provided by gastric tube or intravenously if necessary. 205 Mrs.
Browning's living will further directed that physicians should refrain from
life-prolonging measures when "death is imminent" and where those
procedures would "serve only to artificially prolong the dying process." 206
Subsequent litigation arose as a result of the phrase "death is imminent." The
lower court measured imminence of death based on circumstances other than
207
a lack of food or water.
The court concluded that Mrs. Browning was not terminal, and denied a
petition by Mrs. Browning's legal guardian to terminate artificial life support
systems. 208 On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeals found that Mrs.
Browning had a right to die. Consequently, the life-prolonging procedure
209
should be withdrawn due to the common law right to self-determination.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the district court of appeals and
210
affirmed.
Mrs. Browning's subsequent death did not end the controversy over how to
interpret living wills and give them predictability. In fact, it illustrated the
difficulty of interpretation in such an area, 211particularly regarding the limited
scope and inflexibility of living wills.

203

See, e.g., George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz, A Right About Patients to Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 64 MILBANK Q. 95, 97 (Supp. 2 1986); Rich, supra note 145, at
1114.
2 4

0 [Tihe Concept of Terminal Illness cannot be readily or definitively distinguished
from the chronic, progressive disease. Furthermore, a reliable clinical measures of such
concepts do not now exist." Rich, supra note 145, at 1114-15.
205In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
206

Id. at 275.

207

Id.at 264.

208

1d. at 261.

9

20 Browning, 543 So. 2d at 266. See also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Storar,
420 N.E.2d 64 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
210
211

In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).

0ne corollary problem associated with the development of living wills involved
the legal standard of substituted judgment. This doctrine concerns whether a surrogate
would be permitted to make medical treatment decisions for an incompetent
decision-maker. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). The substituted
judgment doctrine applies when a surrogate is permitted to decide what medical
treatment the patient would have desired. A surrogate takes into account "the patient's
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2. The Health Care Proxy
The limitations of the living will led many states to pursue alternative
advance directives such as the health care proxy. Instead of a piece of paper
governing end of life decisions, a majority of states began to permit an
alternative human decision-maker, a surrogate for adults who become
incapacitated. Different types of surrogates have been created. Some states
permit surrogates with limited powers to carry out the wishes expounded by
patients in living wills. Other states permit agents with almost plenary power,
also referred to as health care proxies.
Health care proxy laws have numerous implications. Perhaps foremost
among these is the removal of death-related decision-making issues from the
judicial arena. 212 The proxy mechanism provides some predictability to an
otherwise ambiguous subject matter.213
a. An Illustration:The New York Law
One illustration of the codification of the health care proxy is the law in the
State of New York. 214 The laws of many other states are similar to this code,
and face similar pitfalls and obstacles.
i. The History of the New York Law
The 1990 New York Health Care Proxy Law, which became effective in 1991,
had to overcome numerous political and substantive objections by various
groups, religious and otherwise. The New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law, a gubernatorial commission, helped shape and promote the law. Even
with the stewardship of the Task Force and the support of former New York
Governor Mario Cuomo, the health care proxy law constituted a bold legisla-

condition, the patient's personal traits, and any relevant statements concerning
treatment that the patient may have made before becoming incompetent." Yuen, supra
note 24, at 597.
The difficulty with this standard, however, is that it is a legal fiction, not based on
the actual statements necessarily of the patient, but on what the patient would be
projected to have wanted. It is well established, moreover, that many patients who are
or become incapacitated do not provide sufficient instructions on the precise nature and
type of medical treatment they desire.
212 Stephen Haimowitz & Robin A. Goldman, A Patient Returns From "Death With
Dignity:" Uncertaintyand the Right to Die, Oct. 1990 N.Y. BAR Ass'N, 58, at 60.
213

The advanced directive laws do not remove all decisions from judicial oversight,
however. Erroneous medical decisions are still subject to the "professional judgment"
standard in medical malpractice cases and expert medical testimony on the matter is
still permitted subject to "a reasonable degree of medical certainty." Id.
214

That law is codified in N.Y. HEALTH CARE AGENTS AND PROXIES LAw § 2980
(McKinney 1992).
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tive initiative during an election year. The termination of life-sustaining
5
treatment was a sensitive subject, and it took considerable effort to pass it.21
ii. The Particulars of the Law
The New York Health Care Proxy Law was enacted to supplement, not
replace other forms of advance directives in New York.216 A separate statute
governing "do not resuscitate" (DNR) orders, as well as established precedent
governing living wills and the right to refuse medical treatment - even
life-saving measures, have been left intact.
In addition to the statutory requirements of the proxy law, New York case
law requires the existence of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
wishes concerning decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining
treatment.2 17 Unlike other jurisdictions, the New York Court of Appeals
expressly rejected permitting the termination of life support based on
"substituted judgment," a standard independent of the patient's expressed
2 18
wishes.
iii. What the New York Law Provides
The New York proxy law permits competent adults to delegate all forms of
medical treatment decisions to a human decision-maker. The law is triggered
when the adult becomes incompetent, losing the ability to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of health care decisions, including the
benefit of alternatives. 2 19 The initial determination of capacity is made by the
attending physician. If that determination is contested by the principal, the
principal prevails unless a court finds otherwise.220

2 15

1t is not surprising, then, that political maneuvering was significant. Senate

Majority Leader Marino's support was crucial for its passage, for example, and he had
reservations about the law, fearing abuses if the law was enacted. Yet, here is where the
auto accident involving Nancy Cruzan had its impact on New York. Within a week of
the decision in Cruzan, the N.Y. proxy bill was adopted by the legislature.
2 16

The legislative intent of the N.Y. law states:
This legislation is intended to establish a decision-making process
to allow competent adults to appoint an agent to decide about health
care treatment in the event they lose decision-making capacity. The
legislature does not intend to encourage or discourage any particular
health care decision or treatment.... This legislation confers no
new rights ....

N.Y. Code § 2980.

2 17

The State of Missouri also required clear and convincing evidence, as did the
Cruzan court. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 408 (Mo. 1988).
2 18
1n the Matter of Westchester County Hospital, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
219

The law states: "'The capacity to make health care decisions' means the ability to
understand... consequences... and to reach an informed decision." New York Code

§ 2980.
220

Id. § 2983(1) & (5).
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A proxy must act based on the patient's wishes or, if those wishes are not
known, in the patient's best interests. 22 1 A special exception has been carved
out for decisions about artificial life-sustaining nutrition and hydration. 222 In
those cases, the proxy must affirm that he or she has knowledge of the patient's
wishes. This knowledge can arise from various sources, including written
statements or oral conversations. 223 Without actual knowledge of the patient's
wishes, a proxy cannot act simply in the patient's best interests.
To effectuate a health care proxy, the directive must (1) be in writing; (2)
contain a statement of delegation of health care decision-making power; (3)
indicate who is delegating the decision-making authority and who is to be the
agent; (4) be signed by two adult witnesses, neither of whom will serve as the
proxy; and (5) signed by the principal. 224 The proxy need not sign the form or
consent to serve as proxy. Furthermore, an alternative proxy can be designated.
Health care professionals can object to a proxy's decision in certain limited
circumstances, namely those decisions based on moral grounds or religious
beliefs to which the professional would object even if made by a competent
patient. The law provides that the care of the patient then shall be transferred
to another health care professional. 225
The proxy law not only applies to patients and treating physicians, but also
applies to hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, diagnostic and treatment
centers, home health agencies, and Health Maintenance Organizations. 226 The
law requires that these organizations provide all adults upon admission-or
enrollment in a Health Maintenance Organization-with written information
about their rights under New York law. 227 The law also requires these
organizations to document in the patient's record whether a proxy or advance
directive has been chosen. 228 The law mandates, as does the federal law, that
these institutions conduct community education on advance directives. 229
IV. THE PROBLEM: THE DISUSE OF THE HEALTH CARE PROXY
It is not surprising that despite the creation of legal advance directives,
including the flexible and readily implemented health care proxy, the edifice is
practically vestigial. To illustrate, a 1987 Gallup Poll of almost one thousand
22 1

1d. § 2982(2).
222d.
2 23
Note: the "knowledge" limitation does not require proof by clear and convincing
evidence.
224M4. § 2981.

225

1d. § 2984(4).
See N.Y. Code § 2980.
227Id. § 2991(1).
226

2281d. § 2984(1).
229

1d. § 2991.
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people showed that 70% of those polled preferred not to be on life support if
they were in an irreversible coma. The same poll indicated, however, that less
than 10% of those polled utilized advance directives to have such wishes
followed. 230 Several studies have reached similar conclusions, 231 including one
study of law students conducted specifically for the purposes of this paper.
That study is described in greater detail below.
A. The 1994 Nova Law Center Survey
In February of 1994 a survey was conducted of 300 Nova Law Center
233
students 232 about their views and conduct regarding advance directives.
The results essentially corroborated other studies and polls. Only 24% of those
surveyed understood the meaning of advance directives. While 92% would
consider appointing a surrogate, only 26% of the respondents had actually
designated a surrogate decision-maker. 23 4 Sixty percent of those respondents

230

Steiber, Right to Die: Public Balks at Decidingfor Others,HosPITALS, Mar. 5, 1987 at

72.
23 1

"In one study, 148 elderly outpatients were told about advance directives, given
living will and health care proxy forms, and even provided with a reminder card to give
to their physicians. Only 12 percent of patients actually completed the living will within
one year. In a more recent study, involving 60 outpatients who were given written
information about advance directives, not one completed a living will." CATE & GILL,
supra note 83, at 22.
232
The survey was submitted to approximately 850 students. Three hundred
completed the survey.
233

The Survey asked:
1. Do you understand the meaning of "advance directives?"
2. Do you have a living will?
3. Do you have someone designated as a surrogate who would make health care
decisions for you if you were unable to do so?
4. Would you designate someone who would make health care decisions for you
in the event you were physically or mentally unable to communicate your decisions?
5. Upon being admitted to the hospital, have you ever been given information
concerning "advance directives", living wills, and/or surrogates?
6. While in any hospital have you ever been asked whether you had a living will
or a designated surrogate?
7. Do you agree that every competent adult has the fundamental right of
self-determination, including the right to refuse medical care?
8. If you had a terminal condition from which there was no reasonable probability
of recovery, would you consider refusing any life-prolonging procedures?
9. Would you express this desire in a living will?
10. Would you appoint a surrogate (any person) to make that decision for you?
11. If you answered "no" to 8,9, or 10, please indicate why.
234

While 22% indicated they had signed a living will, there likely is substantial
overlap as in other surveys with those persons who appointed a surrogate, particularly
in light of the admitted lack of understanding about the nature of advance directives.
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ever admitted to a hospital stated that they had received information on
advance directives upon admission.23 5
The disparity between actions relating to advance directives and general
beliefs about those same directives was again evident. Ninety-five percent of
those surveyed believe that individuals possess a fundamental right to die.
Ninety-one percent of those responding would consider the removal of
life-prolonging procedures if they had a terminal condition. 236 Ninety percent
stated that they would express that desire in a living will, while 85% would
appoint a surrogate.237 This data suggests that advance directives are
conceptually appealing but practically abhorrent. It appears a free flow of
information about the nature and value of advance directives does not exist,
and the personalization of the subject matter is foreign if not uncomfortable for
many students.238
B. Interviews and Other Information
Interviews with health care providers, people without proxies, and people
with proxies all corroborate the observation that the health care proxy is widely
deemed to be a welcome addition to a patient's choices. Almost everyone
interviewed, however, recognized that the proxy may be grossly underused.
1. New York Interviews
Interviews were conducted with administrators at fourteen hospitals around
New York state and in the State of Florida as part of a Columbia University
Center for the Study of Medicine and Society project.239 Interviews also

235This response, however, may be skewed, since 90% of those surveyed had never
been admitted to a hospital for major surgery.
236This percentage, of course, can be contrasted with the percentage of respondents

who actually adopted advance directives.
237

Survey, supra note 233.

238

Some of the comments made by students who would not consider adopting an
advance directive are illuminating:
"Who would I trust to make that decision? Things change."
"Since technology permits health institutions to prolong the life of a
patient, I see no reason why one should not make use of it."
"No one should be faced with the responsibility of making such a
choice for a loved one. From personal experience, I feel that the
person who is left to make that choice will forever wonder if it was
the correct one."

"Decision might be financially based."
"Others can be too emotionally attached to think clearly."
"There are certain decisions in life that should be made individually
and not allocated. This is one of them."
'Idon't trust people."
"I'm a sucker for long shot bets."
239
These interviews mostly occurred in the fall of 1992 as part of the Columbia
University project which culminated with a presentation in May of 1993 sponsored by
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occurred with doctors at the various hospitals as well as patients and
non-patients.
a. The Administrators
Various hospital administrators were interviewed. Interviews were mostly
conducted with patient representatives, hospital ethicists, and chiefs of
medicine. Several hospital vice presidents were interviewed as well.
As interviews and observations make clear, the administrators are fully
informed about the details of the Health Care Proxy Law. Significantly, as a
group they were highly sympathetic with its goals.
Administrators favored the Act for various reasons. Some believed that the
Act had the potential to reduce hospital length of stay and avoid futile medical
interventions. Others agreed with one administrator who noted, "it saves
recourse to the courts." The majority of those interviewed favored the law
because it promoted enhanced patient self-determination. The majority also
believed that the law would not in fact save hospital resources, nor was it
intended to do so.240
Based on the interviews, it appeared that all of the hospitals were in
compliance with the mandate of the law. The hospitals have instructed their
admissions offices to inquire of every entering patient whether he or she has
appointed a proxy. If the answer is yes, that fact is duly noted in the patient
information system. The Administration may then receive a daily print-out of
all patients in the hospital who have a proxy. Also, the packet of hospital
materials that the patient receives upon admission contains a copy of the proxy
form and instructions on how to complete it. The Office of the Patient
Representative in these hospitals is generally responsible for assisting patients
in filling out the forms and answering any questions they may have. In
addition, patients sometimes can view a video about the Health Care Agent
Act (in both Spanish and English) by choosing the appropriate hospital channel
on the television monitor in each room.

Empire Blue Cross. Additional interviews occurred in Spring 1993, Fall 1993, and Spring
1994.
The hospitals that participated in the interview process generally requested
anonymity. The hospitals were of varying sizes and kinds, including large urban
hospitals in New York City, medium rural hospitals in Cooperstown, New York, private
religious hospitals such as Holy Cross in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and public
non-religious hospitals in New York. Some of the physicians interviewed were not
affiliated with any of the hospitals.
24 0Itis questionable whether the proxy law really favors "death with dignity" as many
people claim. The perception of some is that the real purpose of the law is substantive

- to be able to withdraw treatment. This perception is perhaps fueled by calls to end
futile medical care for dying patients or evidence such as that from medical experts who
testified that Nancy Cruzan could have survived for 30 more years in her vegetative
state. Perhaps, it is not just death with dignity the law favors, it may be unavoidable
that this proxy law, as some have suggested, is really about the allocation of resources,
about saving money.
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On the basis of project observations and interviews, it is apparent that while
specific inquiries are made about whether the patient has a proxy, the lack of
time, skill, training, or information allow the matter only minimal attention.
241
The proxy becomes a check-off box - yes, no, and then on to the next subject.
The problem of insufficient administrative attention is compounded by the
timing of the delivery of proxy information at the admission. Given the tension
that accompanies a hospital admission, administrators note that patients rarely
pursue the topic at that point. Thus, only a small minority of patients take
advantage of the proxy act on any given day. The proxy log of the Office of the
Patient Representative at one institution highlights the difficulty inherent in
discussing the proxy with patients at the admissions interview. As of May 1993,
the loghad 435 proxies on record. 242 Of the 435,179 were designated as patients
who had proxies on admission.243 Another fifty-five were designated as
patients who named proxies because of interaction with the nursing staff about
the proxy. A third group of fifteen was identified as patients who signed proxy
forms at one of the various clinics affiliated with the medical center prior to
admission. Of the remaining 186 patients with proxies, two were identified as
having proxies due to their own initiative, and the remainder were designated
as having proxies for "other" reasons or not having proxies at all. Taken
together, patients with proxies on admission 244 and patients appointing
proxies as a result of interaction with the nursing staff represent two tenths of
one percent of the institution's admissions during the two and a half year
period that the list covers.
A different hospital, 245 with 300 beds, performed an informal study of
patients admitted to the hospital for a one week period in 1992.246 The study
found that 28% of the admittees had never heard of the health care proxy or
DNR law; 13% of the patients had signed a health care proxy; and 21% had
signed a living will. Some of these patients had signed both. Seventy-two
percent wanted more information about health care proxies and 67% wanted
more information about living wills.
Another two hospitals estimated that only 8% to 10% of the patients
admitted were signing advance directives. Several hospital administrators
241

If the patient does ask about it, he or she often will be told to consult the packet.

242

The Office began collecting this information in January 1991, just as the New York

Health Care Agent Act took effect.
243

There is no way of knowing if the patient was admitted with a proxy or named
one as a result of the admission interview.
244This analysis gives the benefit of the doubt to the hospital staff by presuming the
proxy was elected on admission to the hospital.
245
46

The hospital requested anonymity for the purposes of any report of its survey.

2 Excepting serious cases in the emergency room and some patients from the
maternity ward, 117 of the 167 patients admitted were interviewed. The ages of the
patients ranged from twenty to eighty. Forty-one percent of those interviewed were
male and 59% were female.
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noted that patients were not the only group failing to sign proxies. One hospital
assistant vice president observed that "few people in management had signed
health care proxies." It was even noted that a former New York Commissioner
of Health had not signed one and consequently had been kept alive for a
sustained period of time on a life support system in a hospital. Even the
majority of some hospital ethics committees were without proxies or other
advance directives.
b. Some Observationsabout the Impact of the New York Health CareAct
on Hospital Culture
i. The Act's Burden
The burden of implementing the Health Care Proxy Act has fallen almost
entirely on hospitals' patient representative offices. It appears that the doctors,
as well as other hospital staff, are either too busy or disinclined to promote the
health care proxy. Doctors may be highly skilled and trained individuals, but
this study revealed that their skills may not extend to conversations about
things such as the health care proxy and the death of their patients. One
psychologist who discussed end-of-life communication issues with physicians
and patients, for example, concluded that the "two groups do not communicate
well .... "247 Even if physicians and the hospital staff were superior
communicators, the numerous other demands they face may lead to the same
result. Said one patient relations coordinator, "the mandate of the Act was
received with 'we'll do it because they tell us to do it."'
The Administrators were ready to offer suggestions about improving
implementation. One director of patient representatives remarked, "the Act
should be implemented in doctors' offices as far ahead of time as possible."
Another person said, "it should be implemented in an out-patient capacity."
ii. The Role of Physicians
Interviews with physicians practicing internal medicine at one hospital
indicated that at least at that hospital, a split in approach to the proxy along
generational lines occurred. The incident that provoked the most useful
comments from doctors at that hospital was a proposal by the Hospital's Ethics
Advisory Committee. The Committee suggested that the building adjoining
the hospital, where affiliated physicians have offices, should include brochures
and information about the proxy law in its waiting areas. Each waiting area is
shared by a number of physicians. The Governing Committee refused
permission, on the grounds that it would be too disturbing to patients to see
the materials. Some observers suggested, however, that the decision was made
because patients would ask too many questions and take too much time on the

247

Faye J.Girsh, PhysicianAid-in-Dying: What Physicians Say, What Patients Say, THE
188 (Aug. 1992) (the author is the founder of the San Diego
Hemlock Society).
WESTERN J. OF MED. 188, at
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issue. It appeared that younger physicians were more disturbed by the
Governing Committee's decision than older ones. Older physicians often still
consider a discussion of these issues as too anxiety-producing for patients. 24 8
There was disagreement on whether a medical "generation gap" existed,
however. At another hospital, for example, one knowledgeable observer did
not use age as a distinguishing factor, but specialty. The administrator
suggested that the group of doctors most likely to ignore the Act were surgeons
249
and neurosurgeons.
Most of the doctors interviewed strongly supported the principles of the Act.
The few doctors who engaged in a narrative with patients involving the health
care proxy found it to be worthwhile.250 One doctor commented that even
when discussions about the proxy did not result in an appointment, they were
useful because they provided a forum for "getting things out on the table" and
starting people thinking. Another doctor appreciated the advance planning a
proxy discussion promotes. Without proxies, the doctor stated, "I've had
families come to me and say: 'We believe in miracles, do everything you can,'
and this despite the fact the patient is brain dead."
Yet, the doctors' affirmance of the principles underlying the proxy act does
not mean that they actively promote it. Most of the doctors did not. The reasons
for this omission ranged from a lack of time for discussion with patients, to the
view that only the very sick needed to appoint proxies. Almost none of the
doctors interviewed had attempted to educate their patients about the health
care proxy other than, in a few rare instances, having the forms available in
their own office. As one physician noted, "I don't talk with patients about it,
but I probably should."
One reason for physicians' reluctance to educate their patients appears to lie
in the fact that they think it will scare the patients. Stated one physician:
I think that it is a shared responsibility to a certain extent because if
you as a physician approach a patient when he is coming into the
hospital because of a supervening illness that [discussion of advance
directives] carries a heavy connotation - 'Oh, by the way, we're
bringing you into the hospital and what do you think about life

248

However, one doctor who has been practicing for forty years and favors living
wills stated: "Younger doctors tend in a way to be very well-trained technicians, but
they are not really in command of a set of ethics with regards to death and the handling
of this problem. Maybe they need to practice a little bit more." Interview with Dr.
William Leen, surgeon, in Boca Raton, Fl. (Feb. 9,1994) [hereinafter Leen Interview].
24 9

0ne nurse stated: "A provider who is more receptive to patient's rights [is more

likely to bereceptive toproxyissues]; someof the younger guys can bej ust as controlling
as older ones." Telephone Interview with Mary L. Reid, nurse practitioner, Jacksonville,
Fl. (Feb. 19,1994) [hereinafter Mary Reid Interview].
250

The few doctors who had worked with proxies in making decisions about patient
care found the proxies to be active decision-makers and well-informed about the
patient's wishes.
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support and all that?' The patient thinks, 'Well, there's something that
he is not telling me.'
Other reasons for the lack of a dialogue on the health care proxy exist. One
reason is the narrative of denial within the medical culture. Talking to a patient
about death may be much more difficult than trying to extend the patient's life
through life-sustaining measures. Another reason may be that many doctors
remain unfamiliar with the law and do not really understand it themselves.
Other doctors do not see why patients who are not seriously ill would need a
proxy. Still other physicians have stated that they have always talked with the
family about what to do for a patient in a persistent vegetative state and had
no problem. Perhaps the failure of doctors to comply with the law may have
as much to do with attitudes about the legislature as about the proxy law itself.
As one physician noted, "what the legislature does is irrelevant to real life."
V. PROPOSAL: USING THE LAW TO PROMOTE A

NEW

NARRATIVE OF DEATH

This paper suggests that the prevailing narrative of death - in which
avoidance and denial are paramount - contributes greatly to the resulting
disuse of the health care proxy. To overcome the impediment of the current
narrative of death, and to allow the socio-cultural and legal responses to catch
up to advances in medical technology, the law can be used to facilitate the
creation of a new narrative of death. This new narrative will focus society on
the importance of facing death-related issues.
A significant premise of the proposal to use the law to create a new narrative
is that "[n]owhere is communications more important, more lacking or less
studied than in the interaction between physicians and their patients, patients'
families, medical colleagues, and other professionals about life and death
decisions. 2 51 The value of the legal apparatus, therefore, lies in the various
conversations it creates. The law's promotion of enhanced communication may
by itself serve to meet the end of a revised narrative. Such communication can
increase awareness of the subject matter of death and propel the transfiguration
of the moral geography lying underneath. 252 With the general lack of
understanding about these matters, face-to-face communication may be
253
essential.

25

1Newton N. Minow, former Chair, Federal Communications Commission, as
quoted in the Ninth Annual James C. Hemphill Lecture at Northwestern University for
the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, Communications in Medicine: Do Doctors and
Lawyers Know How to Listen?. See CATE & GILL, supra note 83, at 3.
252As one New York hospital administrator observed, "The [health care proxy] Act
assures patients a more meaningful conversation in entering a hospital."
253

For example, how else will the public be informed that treatment may be
terminated only if there is clear and convincing evidence pursuant to the particular
state's law? How will individuals know what clear and convincing evidence is, even if
they are aware of the standard? Even if the virtues of patient's rights are presented
directly to thepublic, 'If the law has baffled legal experts, legislators, and medical practi-
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Thus, the purpose of a new narrative, as well as health care proxy laws and
advance directives generally, is not to create unilateral medical warnings, i.e.,
the functional equivalent of Miranda v. Arizona,254 but to create a bilateral
exchange between various groups: 255 (1) between doctor (or health care
provider) and patient; (2) between hospital and patient; and (3) between
256
patients and their proxies (or simply between persons and their loved ones).
These exchanges have their own subtexts that can be arranged or shielded from
view by the law. It may be important in some of these subtexts, such as health
care professional-patient, to delineate the content of the conversation; in other
subtexts, such as patient-loved ones, it may simply be sufficient to carve out
an opportunity to have it, rather than describe its content and structure.
The occurrence of such a conversation, however, does not ensure a successful
dialogue; a reimagining of the hour of death is also imperative. This
reconceptualization is fostered by the adoption of a new narrative of death, one
which includes a restructuring of society's collective beliefs about death.
Altering such collective beliefs takes time. It is a gradual process with various
components. The components of this process include creating communication
skills, delegitimizing the current narrative, changing that narrative's aesthetic,
and, finally, substituting an alternate narrative.
A. Creating CommunicationSkills
In order for a new death narrative to occur, a predicate competency in
communication must exist. While communication is often necessary for human
survival and development, the skills necessary for competent communication
are often omitted from formal education settings. Thus, highly skilled
individuals in law, medicine or other professions may lack the communicative
competency to implement the new narrative successfully.
These groups must learn that their substantive professional expertise likely
does not provide competency in fostering a dialogue about death. The ability
of scientists, doctors, and lawyers to resolve intractable medical and legal issues
in the past does not mean that self-determination issues are on a similar plane
257
or within their domain for resolution in the first place.
tioners, how is a patient suppose to understand what her rights are?" Yuen, supra note
24, at 619.

254384 U.S. 436 (1966).
255
As one commentator has observed, the purpose of the Patient Self-Determination
Act is "education and communication, not the creation or modification of substantive

legal rights." CATE & GILL, supra note 83, at 9.
256

1n addition to specialized dialogues with particular parties, the narrative of death
is dependent on a more generalized conversation promulgated by the media and public
speech, from the schools to the politicians to the special interest groups. To affect this
generalized dialogue requires better communication of the substance of advance
directives and the health care proxy and the message - or narrative - of its true value.
257
As the former Chairperson of the Federal Communications Commission stated:
"the extraordinary achievements of technology pose fundamental questions which
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Formally educating these groups in the particulars and rationale of the new
narrative may be required. They may have to be directly taught that
communication skills are part of a separate competency. This competency
involves skills that foster the creation of a safe environment for such a
potentially sensitive area and permits discussion of the subject matter in an
effective manner.
The skills training can occur during professional school education, including
law, medical, and dental schools, among others. It could also occur in
post-degree continuing education courses, as a special component of an
existing course or as an entirely separate program. It is notjust the professionals
who must be taught, but the hospitals, health maintenance organizations and
consumers as well. These groups can be required to devote a modicum of
resources in educating their employees and consumers. There also can be
education in colleges and other venues where a dialogue can be created.
The law can be used to encourage and coerce compliance with such a
mandate. It can set up incentives to educate or penalties for failing to do so,
and create a scheme by which the burden of implementation is dispursed. This
will not ensure that a dialogue occurs, but it will at least increase the likelihood
of the transformation of the narrative of death.
1. Delegitimizing the Dominant Narrative of Death
The current narrative of the denial of death must be shown to be illegitimate
before it will be readily dropped. The illegitimacy of the narrative emerges in
numerous ways. These include the costs of a technology-delayed lingering
death or a hospital death; the recognition of the proxy as a multidisciplinary
social issue, not simply a medical one; the costs of an illusory belief in
immortality; and many other costs as well. Some of these costs are explored
below.
Families and friends who witness a lingering and perhaps painful hospital
death often regret the failure to have promoted a more peaceful and familiar
death for their loved ones.2 58 Minimizing a family's pain and suffering over
observing a loved one's lingering and painful death, as well as the avoidance
of that suffering for the patient, is a valuable commodity, and should be treated
as such. This pragmatic assessment of the value of the death narrative is in
some ways no different than the valuation of either life or disability insurance.
The denial of the inexorable process of aging also has exacted a heavy price.
It resulted in the hubris of science generally and a belief that science had

physicians, lawyers and judges cannot and should not answer alone." Newton N.

Minow, in the Ninth Annual James C. Hemphill Lecture at Northwestern University for
the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, Communications in Medicine: Do Doctors and
Lawyers Know How to Listen?
258
"A few friends shared with me their regret about their parents dying prolonged
and painful deaths alone in the hospital, sedated or agitated, not recognizing their
children .... If a family member is dying in a hospital and wants to return home, try to
find the means to do it." Sumers, supra note 106, at 14.
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succeeded in denying various diseases in particular. Instead of living fully in
the present, individuals were conditioned to engage in the futile attempt to
deny the inevitable.
2. The Importance of a Multi-Disciplinary Response
The dominant narrative of death is also constructed around an insular
medical culture that appears to almost unilaterally govern itself without much
overlap or interference from other cultures and communities, such as the law.
The insularity of the medical hierarchy, built in part on a desire for
self-governance and a hubris born out of isolation, however, is eroding. Many
medical issues - such as life-sustaining treatment decisions - are now being
viewed as more complex social issues that cut across legal, medical,
psychological, and cultural boundaries. For the proxy law to succeed the
medical culture can not engage in unilateral governance. Rather, cooperation
in the medical, business, law, and social sciences communities is imperative.
The lack of insularity of the medical culture also assists in delegitimizing the
medical view of the patient. Today, the principle of patient autonomy prevails.
This principle also cuts across disciplinary boundaries.
The principle of autonomy motivates both the medical and legal disciplines
of
in their resolution of issues pertaining to the right to die. 259 This principle 260
choice is generally considered integral to patient self-determination,
particularly with regard to the procedures used on the patient to promote the
261
patient's physical and mental health.

259
Yet, the conceptualization of autonomy is as fuzzy as the epistemology relating to
the other definitions in this area. In the context of death, there is increasing recognition
that, in the words of Thomas Mann, "A man's dying is more the survivors' affair than
his own." This analysis requires a renewed inquiry into the meaning of autonomous
decision-making by patients.
260
See also Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Recessitating Self-Deterninationfor the
CriticallyI11, 35 ARiZ. L. REv. 23, 40 n.78 (1993). Thus, the principle of autonomy does not
extend to the right to obtain medically unnecessary or even harmful treatment.
261

Some commentators suggest that the legal system elevates autonomy as the
principle value in the area of medical decision making. Allan S. Brett & Lawrence B.
McCullough, When Patients Request Specific Interventions, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1347,
1349. Other commentators suggest that patient autonomy involves both positive and
negative rights - the positive right that the patient's desired treatment be implemented,
and the negative right that the patient can refuse the suggested treatment. Id. Yet, the
same commentators suggest that limits on patient autonomy exist. These include the
physician's own moral principles and how well established the medical basis is for the
patient's request. Id. The authors state that:
Moral and medical values obviously are not extraneous factors
in clinical decision-making ... if the physician facilitates the
patient's request for an unnecessary or harmful intervention to
satisfy a principle of respect for patient autonomy, the action
reciprocally undermines the physician's autonomy.
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3. Changing the Aesthetic of the Narrative
Revising the aesthetic of the narrative of death promotes its change. This
supposition is premised on the belief that the meaning of a text or narrative is
greater than its actual words, and extends to both nonverbal cues and an overall
aesthetic. This aesthetic, governed by emotive, smell, and visual connotations,
262
is often more important than the individual words.

One way to affect the aesthetic of the narrative of death is to replace or
diminish the role of fear, perhaps with respect or even reverence for death as a

part of the evolutionary process. The aesthetic of death need not be viewed in
the context of the individual losing connection to life, for example, but rather
in passing the torch to the next generation of children who will carry it with
them.
The new aesthetic contemplates the potential for the good death, one that is
gentle and peaceful. It values both planning and "letting go" as preludes to
freedom.263 This valuation applies to the doctors who can not provide any
more treatment, who can let the patients walk away,264 the families of loved
ones, and the dying persons themselves.

B. The Content of an Alternative Narrative
Significant elements of a modified narrative of death include the prospect of
death in the personal realm - at home and not in the hospital - and the prospect
of the good death, a gentle passing onward. This new dialogue will
communicate that hospitals are not places to die,265 but are for other purposes
262

The words of a text do not completely provide its meaning; the context and intent
of the author also inform the meaning. The language of the health care proxy laws, for
example, can and have been construed differently - and even misconstrued - by many
sectors of the population, from the hospital administrators to the doctors to the patients.
This indicates that the language is but one part of the meaning associated with the
words; the context and subtext - or tenor of the words - are other parts. As one
administrator essentially concurred: "Much depends on the humane concern of the
health giver."
263

"Doctors must learn to let go - if there's nothing more to offer the patient then
nothing more should be done - let patients go home. We all should plan for this among
ourselves - preparing our next of kin. Families, husbands, wives need not be fearful. If
a family member is dying in a hospital and wants to return home, try to find the means
to do it." Sumers, supra note 106, at 14.
264

Some physicians consider it their role to aid the dying process when there is
nothing else that can be done:
Itmeans that you should help a person, realizing that that person
is going to die, you should make it as easy as possible, as comfortable as possible, comfort the relatives, let them know what is going
on, and then the patient dies- which, after all, is the destiny of everybody.
Leen Interview, supra note 248.
265
0ne nurse practitioner who believes that death in the hospital can be avoided
described how she speaks to her patient's family about taking care of their loved ones
at home. The individual says to the family:
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such as to have surgery, be treated for illness, and to have babies. 266 While
hospital deaths may allow people to avoid a fear of death at home, the narrative
can inform people that a dead body is far from a macabre occurrence. 267 The
following illustration of an alternative narrative suggests that death in the
home can be a welcome and gentle experience.
1. Rick's Death
As related by his sister, Dr. Anne Ricks Sumers, Rick was a forty year old
attorney with a wife and child who was told by doctors that he had an
inoperable brain tumor.268 While in the hospital, he became disoriented and
confused. The cancer was affecting his brain. 269 His sister stated: "My brother
was a strong guy. He kept getting up out of bed. The hospital staff tied him
down. He was furious, humiliated, embarrassed, enraged, confused and
frightened.'2 70 The hospital was not able to provide further treatment for Rick.
His wish, when he was lucid, was to go home.271
The decision was made and the hospital released him. Dr. Sumers describes
Rick's last night at home:
Rick's last evening was wild, fun, tragic and exhilarating. Rick walked
from room to room in his house, savoring a glass of red wine, eating a
cookie, talking with his best friend, our mother and dad, our sisters
and brothers. Neighbors stopped in with food and stayed for the
conversation. Friends from the Quaker Meeting House stopped by.
Cousins arrived. It was like a Thanksgiving - good food, lots of
conversation,
but the guest of honor would be dead in a few days, or
272
hours.

You know this is a terminal condition, can you all take care of her
at home, do you want to take care of her at home, do you have the
resources, are you comfortable with the fact that she is first going
to slip into a coma and then she is going to stop breathing? And
when she stops breathing you are not going to call 911 and bring
her to the hospital. Call me at home before you call anybody if
you need that support.
Reid Interview, supra note 249.
266
As one opthamologist stated in arguing that death should occur at home: "Please
don't misunderstand me; I like hospitals. Hospitals are great places to live, to struggle
for life, to undergo treatments, to have surgery, to have babies. But not to die. If it's at
all possible, people should die in familiar surroundings in their own beds." Sumers,
supra note 258, at 14.
2 67

Some people are afraid or resistant to the prospect of having a dead body in the
home. Id.
268Id.

2 70

Sumers, supranote 106, at 14.
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The occasion was dignified, not macabre. There was a semblance of
normalcy fostered by the comfort of family and friends. Many of the activities
that occurred were those of daily life. Stated Dr. Sumers:
Although Rick was confused he wasn't frightened. Rick knew he was
in his home, surrounded by friends and family. He was thrilled to be
there. He ate. He cleaned. Hewas busy all evening, reminiscing, telling
fragments of
stories, neatening up, washing dishes, giving advice and
2 73
eating well.
When death came, it occurred in a warm, familiar and loving environment.
While it was not ceremonial as in many cultures, it was personal:
He took his last breath with his wife and his best friend beside him, his
family singing old folk songs in the living room. He was peaceful,
quiet, never frightened or restrained. Rick died far too young. But
everyone should hope to die like this; notiust
with dignity, but with
2 74
fun and love, with old friends and family.
In reflecting on Rick's final night, his sister observed that the cooperation of
many groups was required to recreate death in the personal realm: "Rick's
death was as gentle as a death can be. It worked because all parties - doctors,
family, Rick and Rick's wife - were able to face facts and act on them."275
Dr. Sumers shared with friends about Rick's death. They in turn disclosed
their regrets about having parents die "prolonged and painful deaths alone in
the hospital, sedated or agitated, not recognizing their children."276 The friends
also expressed their fear about witnessing a dead body; "'Wasn't it ugly?' they
2
ask. No, it looked like he was sleeping." 77
VI. CONCLUSION

A narrative of avoidance characterizes modem American society's view of
death. This narrative has become dominant for several reasons. The promise
of extended longevity through the miracles of medicine, Americans' desire for
immortality that is propelled by continuous scientific discoveries, and the
removal of death from the personal realm have enhanced a fear of death that
underlies much, if not all, of life's experiences. This fear of death, in turn, has
spurred its avoidance.
One of the many consequences of this narrative is the failure to utilize
advance directives such as the health care proxy in dealing with individuals
2721d.
273Id.
274

Sumers, supra note 106, at 14.

2 75

Id.

276

1d.

2 77

Id.
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kept alive in a persistent vegetative state or those persons in the advanced
stages of terminal illness. To overcome this failure of the legal apparatus, the
narrative of death must be transformed to permit and encourage a dialogue
about the transition from life to death. Without a reemergence of the belief in
the "good death" and a return of death to the personal realm, this
transformation likely will not occur.
The transformation can be promoted by the legal apparatus. That apparatus
can establish a framework for various dialogues, between health care
professional and patient, patient and loved ones, and others, that revolve
around advance directives specifically and the narrative of death generally. A
predicate to success of such a framework involves educating those who deal
with death-related issues professionally, including doctors and other health
care providers, estate planning attorneys, life insurance agents, and religious
leaders, in a new dialogical imperative, a narrative of the good and personal
death. An awareness can be created that social constructs often take longer to
build than associated technological advances, and that those social creations
often require direct attention and work. Only then might the health care proxy
be better utilized; only then might the death it concerns be recast as a "season"
of life, just one inevitable part of life's natural progression.

